





Keeping Order in the Courtroom
1. 
Radovan Karadzic,
former Bosnian Serb 
leader, indicted for 





president of Serbia 
and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, 
1989–2000, indicted 
for crimes against 
humanity and genocide, 
died during trial, 
March 11, 2006 
5.
Duch, or Kaing 
Guek Eav, former 
Khmer Rouge leader 
in Cambodia, charged 
with crimes against 
humanity, on trial, 
July 2009
3.
Charles Taylor, former 
Liberian president, 
indicted for war crimes, 
on trial, July 2009
6.
Jean Kambanda,
former prime minister 
of Rwanda, guilty of 
genocide, sentenced 




president of Iraq, 
1979–2003, convicted 
of crimes against 





colonel, guilty of 
genocide, sentenced 











Keeping Order in the Courtroom
Patricia M. Wald
OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE
Copyright © 2009 by the Open Society Institute. All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmit-




400 West 59th Street
New York, NY 10019 USA
www.soros.org
For more information, contact: 
Open Society Justice Initiative 
400 West 59th Street
New York, NY 10019 USA
www.justiceinitiative.org
Cover designed by Jeanne Criscola l Criscola Design
Text layout by Judit Kovacs l Createch Ltd.
Cover photography (see page 1 for identification):
1. Karadzic: Jerry Lampen l AFP l Getty Images
2. Milosevic: Paul Vreeker l AFP l Getty Images
3. Taylor: Walter Dhladhla l AFP l Getty Images
4. Hussein: AP Photo l Iraqi Special Tribunal
5. Duch: AP Photo l Mak Remissa
6. Kambanda: Alexander Joe l AFP l Getty Images
7. Bagosora: Reuters l George Mulala
Contents
Foreword   7
I. Introduction 9
II. The Scope of Charges and Number of Codefendants 13
III. Judicial Control of the Proceedings 21
IV. The Right to Self-Representation  37
V. Media Control 47
VI. Systemic Problems in Self-Representation 51
VII. Lessons for Upcoming Leader Trials 55
VIII. Conclusion and Recommendations for Future Trials 59
Notes    63
   5

Foreword
A significant development of our era is that an increasing number of heads of state and 
government, and others who have exercised substantial power, are being held account-
able in judicial proceedings for gross abuses of human rights committed while they 
held power. Since 1993, several international criminal tribunals have been established 
for that purpose, including the permanent International Criminal Court. In addition, 
former leaders have also been tried for such crimes in a number of national courts, 
starting with the trials of the Greek colonels in the late 1970s and of the Argentine 
generals in the mid-1980s, up through the trials of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Alberto 
Fujimori in Peru in this decade.
Inevitably, some of the former leaders put on trial have attempted to use their right 
to defend themselves to disrupt and discredit the proceedings in which they are judged. 
This poses a major challenge to the courts where they are being tried. It is a challenge 
that is especially great in the case of the international criminal tribunals because of their 
newness and because questions about their legitimacy may resonate with the national-
ist sympathizers of defendants who appear before them. In meeting that challenge, it 
is essential that trials should be conducted in a manner that fully protects the rights of 
defendants. A major purpose of bringing such matters before a court is to demonstrate 
that justice can be done through fair proceedings even when they involve countries that 
have been devastated by the arbitrary exercise of power. At the same time, it is crucial 
that judges should maintain firm control of what happens in court so as to maintain the 
dignity of the proceedings and to ensure that witnesses are not deterred from testifying. 
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Judges cannot allow obstreperous defendants to degrade the judicial process for their 
own political purposes. Striking the right balance is no easy task. 
The Open Society Justice Initiative is pleased to publish Tyrants on Trial: Keep-
ing Order in the Courtroom, by Judge Patricia Wald, a member of the Justice Initiative’s 
Board of Directors. This report reflects Judge Wald’s long experience as a litigator in 
leading cases involving civil rights in the United States; as first a judge and then chief 
judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; and as a judge 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Our hope is that her 
report will assist judges who preside over the trials of former leaders, particularly in 
international criminal tribunals but also in national criminal courts, to strike the right 






In the past decade, we have seen several heads of state as well as military and civilian 
leaders criminally tried under international law for actions taken in their leadership 
capacities. They include Slobodan Milosevic, former president of the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia; Charles Taylor, former president of Liberia; Saddam Hussein, for-
mer president of Iraq; Jean Kambanda, former prime minister of Rwanda; Theoneste 
Bagosora, former Rwandan colonel; and Radovan Karadzic, former Bosnian Serb leader. 
A joint leadership trial for Khieu Samphan, former head of state in Cambodia, and three 
other Khmer Rouge leaders is expected to start next year at the Extraordinary Cham-
bers in the Courts of Cambodia, where another Khmer Rouge leader, Kaing Guek Eav 
(known as Duch), is currently being tried. An arrest warrant has recently been issued 
by the International Criminal Court for President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan for crimes 
committed in Darfur. 
These senior leader trials take place in war crimes courts set up under total or 
partial international auspices since 1993: the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC), and the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC).
1
 The Iraqi 
High Tribunal, while not an international court, was established to try crimes of geno-
cide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity under international law norms.
2
 Prior 
to the 1990s, only a handful of leaders (such as Adolph Eichmann and Klaus Barbie) 
had been tried in national courts for the kinds of crimes recognized in the post–World 
War II Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. In the past 20 years, domestic, regional, and inter-
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national courts have charged 67 heads of state or government with committing serious 
crimes while in office, with fully half of these involving leaders charged with serious 
human rights violations.3
This report looks at some leading examples of trials in international—and, in the 
case of Iraq, domestic—courtrooms involving leaders, many of whom defend them-
selves before the court. The initial sections focus on structural elements in the trial, e.g., 
scope of indictment and joinder of parties, which commentators such as Gideon Boas 
believe contribute to “unmanageable” trials but about which prosecutors are skeptical. 
There is evidence on both sides, to be sure. There appears to be greater consensus 
about the role of the judge and even the substantive law, such as the right to self-repre-
sentation, as critical elements in achieving a fair and expeditious trial not only for the 
defendant but for all participants in the trial.
Leader trials frequently revolve around bigger than life personalities who see 
themselves as historic figures defending nationalistic causes; they are less interested in 
evading conviction than in challenging the legitimacy of those international entities that 
assert jurisdiction to judge them, and in pleading their justifications for what they did to 
homeland audiences. Such trials have “political” overtones in the sense that the accused 
leaders invariably impugn the motives of those trying them as political and defend their 
own actions as done in the best interests of their countries. Both stances are fundamen-
tally at odds with the basic notion of the court as an impartial, independent adjudicator 
of individual guilt under accepted rules of international law. These trials not surprisingly 
are often “unruly” and “messy,” since the accused, and sometimes their advocates as 
well, see little advantage in following the rules, obeying court procedures, and display-
ing the respect for judges or the process that national and international courts generally 
command. Experience with these leader trials has given rise to searching questions as 
to whether traditional notions of how to run a criminal trial that meets international 
standards of fairness can accommodate their aberrational behavior. Disruptions in the 
courtroom are inevitably more complex and likely when the leader on trial chooses to, 
and is allowed to, represent himself. This is particularly true for wartime political lead-
ers who have never or rarely set foot in a courtroom, much less in an international court 
with its unique rules and complicated procedures. And since many wartime military 
leaders are far more skilled with the sword than the tongue, threats, bullying, and attack 
mode will often be their first line of defense.
Are there lessons to be learned from the last decade’s experiences on how to man-
age a leader trial, especially but not exclusively when the defendant self-represents? One 
international judge who has presided over such cases worries that the full panoply of 
rules and procedures usually associated with fair trials cannot be followed religiously 
without “adjustments” in cases of the magnitude associated with leader trials,
4
 particu-
larly when the leaders insist on representing themselves. How do judicial procedures 
formulated in the main to resolve disputes involving single or at least far more limited 
or less extensive episodes of wrongdoing deal with the alleged criminality of plans for 
targeting military or civilian objectives in aerial warfare, acts of aggression toward neigh-
boring nations, expulsion and maltreatment of millions of persons, and plans designed 
to be executed by hundreds and thousands of subordinates in the ranks of large-scale 
military and civilian organizations? 
International cases, moreover, must be decided within the boundaries of an 
embryonic jurisprudence with sparse precedent compared with the centuries of law and 
practice available to judges and lawyers in the domestic criminal arena. Yet despite the 
emergence during the same time period that saw the creation of international courts, of 
truth and reconciliation commissions based on principles of confessions by perpetrators 
of wartime atrocities in exchange for communal forgiveness and retributive penalties, 
there is still a strong sentiment in international law communities that the most seri-
ous wrongdoers deserve criminal punishment. That was the theme of Nuremberg, the 
prototype of these leader trials held in the aftermath of World War II, and it continues 
to this day as exemplified by the several international and hybrid criminal courts created 
in the past two decades, most prominently the ICC.
Many supporters of international criminal trials for malevolent leaders who have 
committed massive atrocities seek to accomplish several goals—to record for history 
and victims the full scope of the tyrannical leaders’ misdeeds, to provide basically fair 
and expeditious trials for the individuals accused, to maintain the image of international 
courts as orderly and effective vehicles for dispensing justice to officials whose predeces-
sors enjoyed impunity from criminal accountability for decades, and, when feasible, to 
provide a measure of justice for the victims.
5
 These goals are not always compatible: a 
good deal of balancing, prioritizing, and adjusting regular procedures is often necessary 
to bring these trials off.
6
 What seems to bother critics of these courts most is the disor-
der and sense of continuous anarchy associated with the most notorious leader trials.
7
 
Just as troubling to legal insiders, however, is the difficulty of assuring fairness to all 
participants: the accused, the witnesses, the victims, and the court itself. 
An orderly but unfair trial is the signature of an arbitrary and autocratic regime, 
as displayed in the sham show trials of Soviet Russia, Mao’s China, and Nazi Germany. 
However, in their 1970s book Disorder in the Court, Norman Dorsen and Leon Fried-
man point out that, even in democratic nations that value impartial justice and fair tri-
als, “recurrent patterns of disorderly conduct” occur when “courts are used to enforce 
or implant an unpopular policy” against dissident members of society, or when court 
procedures or rules are themselves perceived as “unjust, discriminatory or improperly 
invoked.”
8
 For example, Gandhi used his trial on civil disobedience as a platform to 
proclaim his opposition to British rule; Walter Raleigh had protested against the same 
sovereign centuries before in his 1603 treason trial. William Penn decried loudly the 
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denial of his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses as well as his right to a copy 
of the indictment before trial when he was tried in 1670 for unlawful assembly. Susan B. 
Anthony behaved decidedly unladylike in her trial for protesting the denial of her right 
to vote; she, like many of the defendants in later leader trials, asserted a right to self-
representation and repeatedly refused to sit down when the judge told her to. World War 
II had its own disorderly trial episodes in the post–World War II sedition trials of U.S. 
Communist Party officials and, in the late 1960s, the Chicago 7 trial of anti–Vietnam 
War protestors accused of inciting riots against Chicago police. After examining these 
and other trials, Dorsen and Friedman conclude: “Courts are seldom isolated from the 
turmoil of the political sphere in any nation.”
9
 Why then should we expect a different 
result in the vastly wider stage of international war settings? 
It is noteworthy that virtually all of the disruptive techniques used currently by 
heads of state were previewed in earlier trials: defense lawyers repeating each other’s 
objections, accused interrupting the judge and witness examinations, attorneys and 
accused absenting themselves from the trial in boycotts, hunger strikes by defendants 
in detention, refusals to accord judges or prosecutors any respect in manner of address, 
repeated insults and name-calling of the judges, attempts to introduce repetitious and 
irrelevant evidence, intimidation of witnesses, complaints about abusive treatment 
of the accused in detention, refusal to obey court orders or comply with court rules, 
accused deliberately turning their backs to the judge, lawyers throwing robes on the 
floor, and very occasionally fistfights. The arsenal is apparently finite but transcends 
national and international boundaries.
10
The dilemma for judges presiding over these trials (and for the prosecutors as 
well) is how to respond to, or better still, anticipate this pattern of aberrant behavior in 
a way that preserves the fundamental fairness and expedition of the trial for all partici-
pants while also maintaining the court’s integrity and public respect. In many cases, 
the accused do not deny the acts they have ordered which are the basis of the charges; 
they argue that they did it with beneficent and patriotic motives, such as self-defense 
or military necessity, and that they must be allowed to make those motives clear to the 
public to show the hypocrisy and perfidy of their accusers. While such defenses have 
rarely been successful in justifying violations of humanitarian law,
11
 they are often politi-
cally attractive at least to the audiences the accused cares about. Thus, the court cannot 
ignore the damage to its own image if it appears to act arbitrarily to silence an unruly 
defendant from having his day in court regardless of the merits of his argument. In one 
court participant’s words, “The modern international criminal process” is not “designed 
to deal with intelligent and manipulative accused who do not accept the legitimacy of 
the judicial process” and who “have a political agenda to pursue.”
12
 But as of now, this 
process is all we have, and a survey of its intelligent use and avoidable abuse may be 
helpful until we evolve a better one.
II. The Scope of Charges 
 and Number of Codefendants
One of the earliest points at which the conflicting goals of a leader trial may come into 
focus is the statement of charges or indictment on which the accused will be tried. 
This is initially the prosecution’s call but that decision will likely determine the scope 
of the trial and, most importantly, its manageability. International prosecutors at the 
ICTY, where some of the most troublesome trials have taken place, have understand-
ably wanted the indictments to expose to the world the shocking extent of the criminal 
conduct of the “most notorious criminals known to history”; they say that is what the 
victims and their survivors—as well as history—demand.
13
 But they also argue that, 
especially in the early cases, they were unsure of what the court would require by way 
of proof that the leaders’ conduct was part of a “widespread” or “systematic” campaign, 
and so they were driven in some cases to overkill. Others point out a natural inclina-
tion after a five- or six-year investigation to use the multitude of evidence that has been 
amassed. But critics of those long and tumultuous trials say experience has proven that 
“gargantuan indictments are unmanageable and unnecessary.”
14
 In the Milosevic case, 
it took three years to put on the prosecution case, though, as one prosecutor is quick to 
point out, not all that time can be attributed to the prosecutor’s capaciousness: subtract 
the recesses and adjournments required by the accused’s outbursts, health crises, and 
other diversions, and the real time consumed by the prosecutor’s submissions would 
be reduced to less than three months—90 “ICTY court days.”
15
 Nonetheless, the indict-
ment contained 66 different counts, broken down into 7,000 separate allegations of 
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crime spread over eight years and three conflict zones; 1.2 million pages of prosecuto-
rial evidence had to be disclosed pretrial to Milosevic along with 930 exhibits and 117 
videos. The prosecution first said it planned to call 1,000 witnesses, later reduced to 231 
witnesses for the Kosovo charges and 600 for the Bosnian and Croatian charges (half 
in person, the rest by way of written statements). Eventually, it put on 133 live witnesses 
on the Kosovo portion, and 195 for the other portion. The transcript consumed 47,000 
pages and written filings another 64,000.
16
Excessively long trials that follow in the wake of unnecessarily broad indictments 
not only tend to invite outbursts, but they also carry significant risks of unfairness to the 
accused and damage to the image of the court. It is almost unfathomable for any human 
being, even with legal assistance, to digest the amount of information involved in the 
Milosevic prosecution and respond efficiently to it, especially if he is in detention. From 
personal experience I can assure you that even the judges who sit steadily on a trial for 
over a year and are assisted by computers and legal aides have to stretch their memories 
and powers of concentration to keep track of how the testimony of Witness A in May 
accords or does not accord with what Witness B said in the previous December and 
what Witness C said in the following March. As time passes it is much more likely that 
details—even important ones—may fall between the cracks. Long trials also increase 
the irritability of the accused, the lawyers, and even the judges, eventually giving way to 
public expressions of their frustrations and emotional distress; the number of lengthy, 
politically tinged trials in which either the defendant or a judge eventually claims his 
physical health has been impaired by the proceedings is significant.
17
 In Milosevic’s 
case, tragically, both the accused and the original presiding judge died before the four-
year trial ended. Psychologically, the drain on all participants of months and months of 
courtroom bickering cannot help but lower their tolerance points and make more likely 
ugly exchanges, name-calling, and dramatic gestures, all of course reported in the news 
and on television for shock value and head shaking.
Gideon Boas, a senior legal officer tasked with managing the Milosevic trial for 
chambers, suggests that the Milosevic indictment bears much of the responsibility for 
the long and arduous trial.
18
 The original indictment pertained to the accused’s activities 
in Kosovo alone. After he was apprehended, two additional indictments pertaining to his 
activities in Bosnia and Croatia were issued. The prosecution wanted the three indict-
ments consolidated and tried together; the trial court resisted. The Kosovo portion of the 
case was well along in preparation and the trial was expected to be completed within a 
year. The prosecution argued that all charges in the several indictments were factually 
part of one criminal enterprise headed by Milosevic to create a “Greater Serbia” by expel-
ling the Albanians from Kosovo and Bosnian Muslims and Croatians from the parts of 
those two countries where Serbs were predominant. Boas found this argument factually 
uncompelling. Milosevic was the president of Serbia, of which Kosovo was a province; 
his alleged activities in relation to Serb-dominant parts of Bosnia and Croatia, both of 
which had declared independence from Yugoslavia, were of a different genre altogether 
and had no relation to the creation of a “Greater Serbia.” Boas called the prosecution 
theory “incoherent” insofar as it pleaded all Milosevic’s actions were part of the “same 
transaction.” Ironically, the prosecution also claimed judicial economy as a reason to 
hold one big trial, i.e., witnesses with testimony relevant to all three indictments need 
make only one appearance. And it insisted that Milosevic’s poor health, revealed early 
on, would not inhibit his active participation in a longer trial. At any rate, although “run-
ning a trial on any one of the Milosevic indictments would have tested the boundaries 
of management, the three indictments joined into one case was clearly not conducive 
to best practices in the conduct of complex international criminal trials.”
19
 
Boas’s view of the prosecutor’s responsibility for the length of the trial is not, 
of course, conceded by prosecutors, who point to expert historians who agreed with 
their concept of the single “criminal transaction” at issue. In any case, the prosecution 
successfully appealed the trial court’s ruling that the Kosovo trial should be completed 
before beginning another one involving Bosnia and Croatia. In a decision condemned 
by Boas as “poorly reasoned,”
20
 the ICTY’s appellate chamber sided with the prosecution 
and ruled in favor of one trial though assuring the trial chamber it could renew its sever-
ance ruling later if the trial did in fact prove “unmanageable.” The two new indictments 
added six Croatian regions and 47 Bosnian municipalities to the crime sites involved in 
the Kosovo trial, in all of which murders, exterminations, torture, cruel treatment, expul-
sion, and deportation were alleged. “This ruling,” according to Boas, “stands as a warn-
ing to the overextension of same transaction theories and the underestimation of the 
importance of practical case management issues in the exercise of a court’s discretion to 
join events of indictments into large complex cases.”
21
 Had the trial chamber prevailed 
in severance, Milosevic would almost surely have been convicted or acquitted before his 
death and the image of the court as a fair and effective adjudicator likely enhanced. As 
it was, the case labored on for four years. In the third and fourth years, the trial court 
again raised the issue of severance. At that point, the defense was 75 percent through 
its allotted time with an estimated 199 witnesses still to go; 80 percent of the time it 
had used had been spent on the Kosovo indictment. Following resistance by both the 
prosecution and defense, the trial court ultimately decided against severance.
22
Of course, it is not just the scope of the indictment but the quantum of proof 
proffered that contributes to the length of the trial. The lengthiest trial before any of 
the contemporary tribunals was the Bagosora trial in the Rwanda tribunal—commonly 
known as the Military 1 trial—held against Colonel Bagosora, mastermind of the geno-
cide in Rwanda, and three other top military officials. The trial for genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes lasted 409 trial days spread out over some six years, 
with the court hearing 242 witnesses and receiving over 35,000 pages of documents 
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from six prosecution and seven defense attorneys. The Bagosora indictment charged 
the colonel with 12 counts in 32 pages—not excessively lengthy given the magnitude of 
the crimes and the senior level of the defendant. The oral summary of the judgment, 
however, pointed out the following:
  The amount of evidence in this case is nearly eight times the size of an average single-
accused case heard by the Tribunal. Innumerable pages of pleadings have resulted in about 
300 written decisions. . . . Much of the material has been translated or interpreted into three 
languages. Investigations were conducted and many witnesses were brought from through-
out the world. Each of us in this courtroom today—the bench, the parties, the registry, 
the court reporters, the language section, the witness protection section, and the security 




Despite experienced judges (including the president of the ICTR), prosecutors, 
and defense attorneys, and even though Bagosora did not represent himself, the trial 
limped along for six years; one of the coaccused, ultimately acquitted of all charges, 
spent over 11 years in the ICTR’s detention unit. 
Including too much historical material in the indictment about the background of 
the conflict not only lengthens the trial but may provoke prolonged and irate responses 
by nationalist leader defendants. For example, it has been suggested that the Milosevic 
prosecutors “fram[ed] their case in ways that opened the door to politicization.”
24
 Critics 
say the prosecution discussed Milosevic’s ideology at length, and went into historical 
processes that provided “justification for Milosevic to have endless arguments often 
with the prosecutor losing the arguments,”
25
 due to Milosevic’s greater familiarity with 
Serbian culture and history. The trial as a result became a “showcase” for Milosevic’s 
perspective on past and present events that had led him into the dock: “He was really 
good. Even people who hate him thought he was successful.”
26
 Vojislav Kostunica, the 
then president of Serbia, no friend of the Yugoslav tribunal, criticized the prosecutor’s 
strategy as reflected in the indictment: “By referring to historical events in the early 20th 
century, she [the prosecutor] appeared to contradict her own statement that individuals 
and not the Serbian nation were on trial.”
27
 
The Milosevic indictment, like most other leader indictments, posited an attenu-
ated theory of liability,
28
 meaning that because highly placed officials seldom, if ever, 
commit war crimes personally, their guilt must be established by theories of command 
responsibility or a mode of liability, a cousin to conspiracy, labeled “joint criminal enter-
prise.” Command responsibility requires a showing that the leader knew or should have 
known that his subordinates were committing war crimes and did nothing to prevent or 
punish them. The more complex criminal enterprise theory depends on proof that the 
leader joined with others in a common plan for an illegal end and knew or should have 
foreseen that the others would commit war crimes in furtherance of the illegal plan. 
The difficulty in proving both theories of liability is that the further up the hierarchical 
ladder the leader is, the more complicated must be the evidence showing his influ-
ence or direction all the way down the line to the individuals who actually committed 
the crimes. In the Milosevic case, proof was necessary to show that Milosevic wielded 
power over decisions by the Serbia Supreme Defense Council, which was responsible 
for authorizing much of the military strategy involved in the indictment, strategy that 
was then executed by the Serbian army or other subordinate organs of the Council. It 
was inevitable that the trial would thus spawn repeated debates concerning how the 
chain of command operated to link Milosevic at the top with military and civilian actors 
who committed the atrocities on the ground. Although attenuated theories of liability 
may be unavoidable in leader cases, as was almost certainly true in the Milosevic case 
(few leaders put their nefarious plans on paper anymore, as the Nazis did), to the extent 
that specific crimes can be linked to the leaders through as few layers of officialdom as 
possible, these crimes should be given priority in charging decisions. Attenuated theo-
ries of liability for large numbers of crimes committed over extensive periods of time 
and in far-flung places make for long and complicated trials, which in turn produce 
much greater opportunities for speeches, interruptions, outbursts, and other attention-
getting devices on the part of the accused.
Accordingly, Boas makes the case for “well pleaded indictments” that clearly set 
forth both the particular crimes for which the defendant is accused and the facts of those 
crimes. If the charges involve widespread acts and hundreds of victims, representative 
examples should be selected for which specific evidence will be submitted. The mode 
of liability and the factual basis for alleging that mode should also be set out precisely: 
How did the accused order, instigate, or aid and abet the crimes charged? What was 
the accused’s intent and the facts supporting that intent? What was the relationship 
between the accused and the subordinates who physically committed the crimes? And, 
in the case of criminal enterprise, what was the plan to which the accused agreed and 
what were his contributions? 
The Kosovo portion of the Milosevic indictment is alleged by Boas to have skipped 
several of these steps: no state of mind was alleged, subordinates were not named, the 
phrase “persons known and unknown” appeared frequently, and Milosevic’s contribution 
to the joint criminal enterprise and his presumed knowledge of crimes committed by 
subordinates were not specified. Boas speculates that, had Milosevic or his lawyer, if 
he had had one at that stage, challenged the indictment for these kinds of technical 
deficiencies, many of the charges might have been dropped then and there and a more 
manageable trial reconfigured. Boas also suggests that in trials of Milosevic’s size and 
complexity there should be an adversarial hearing on the adequacy of the indictment 
to inform the accused of what he will be tried for and whether there is prima facie 
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proof to support the indictment. Even if the accused does not object, as Milosevic did 
not, to the absence of specifics in the indictment, the court, sua sponte, should address 
patent defects since charges that are unclear or for which no adequate proof exists will 
clog up the process and prolong the trial. In Milosevic’s case, a motion for acquittal 
filed by court-appointed amici at the end of the prosecution’s case three years into the 
trial resulted in the dropping of 1,000 of the original 7,000 incidents cited by the 
prosecution.
Boas finds the inquisitorial method of trial in civil law countries potentially supe-
rior in developing issues for trial; an investigating judge sifts through the evidence, 
interviews witnesses proffered by the prosecutor, directs his or her own inquiries, and 
prepares a dossier of findings on which the more adversarial trial is based. In short, 
the investigating judge does the sifting to get rid of improbable or vague charges—a 
task that judges confirming indictments at the ICTY on the basis of prosecutorial sub-
missions alone have seemed reluctant to do methodically. The fact, however, is that 
many of the countries that have traditionally employed the inquisitorial system are now 
abandoning it, i.e., Germany, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries. And the use of the 
investigative judges in the Khmer Rouge trials in Cambodia thus far has not resulted 
in any discernable time savings. 
In those cases that continue to be tried in a common law mode, emphasis on 
sharper focus in the indictment on what the prosecution needs to prove to obtain a 
conviction and what it can prove within a reasonable time frame is essential; single 
judges who currently confirm the indictments need also to be more proactive in resist-
ing overly expansive indictments. The evolution of practice in the Yugoslav tribunal’s 
pretrial chambers has reportedly produced more focused charges and fewer witnesses 
than in the earlier trials, an encouraging sign. Boas’s recommendations, however, obvi-
ously accept the premise that a shorter trial on a discrete number of episodes is both 
more likely to be orderly and more fair to the defendants than the larger, longer trial 
exposing a fuller range of the accused’s malfeasance for the world to see. One of the 
Milosevic prosecutors has countered that assumption, writing that “what is required is a 
careful balancing of the rights of the accused with those of the international community 
as a whole, rather than a trial based on generalized conclusions about the size and scope 
of international indictments.”
29
There is also a strong argument made by prosecutors that it is less the length 
or scope of the indictment that makes for needlessly long trials than the management 
of time by the prosecutor, the defense, and the court. If the court sets reasonable time 
allotments and sticks to them, the trial will stay on a timely course. 
Another risk factor cited by some for a disorderly trial is the number of defendants 
joined in the indictment. Multiple defendants—especially if they are all strong person-
alities—can make for rambunctious trials. Multiple defendants mean multiple counsel, 
which in itself can produce a confusing and sometimes chaotic atmosphere; when one 
defendant misbehaves, the other defendants, and sometimes counsel as well, often tend 
to support and even replicate his antics. The trial of the Chicago 7 in the United States 
and of Saddam Hussein and his codefendants in Iraq support this thesis. At the end of 
the Chicago 7 trial, the judge issued 159 citations for contempt, 38 against the lawyers, 
121 against the defendants other than Bobby Seale (the 8th defendant who was severed 
mid-trial)—many for purposeful signs of disrespect like refusing to rise for the judge or 
addressing him contemptuously or for making the same objection after the judge had 
already ruled on it. Forty-one of these, however, were for codefendants and their lawyers 
protesting the treatment of Bobby Seale. All of the contempt citations were eventually 
reversed on appeal because the judge waited too long until the trial was over before 
issuing the contempt citations. But the Chicago 7 trial did show that 10 counsel and 7 
defendants inescapably make for a greater potential for disruption and defiance.
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In contrast, the post–World War II joint leadership trials held in Nuremberg and 
Tokyo against 22 and 28 defendants respectively were—with the possible exception 
of Hermann Goering—not particularly disruptive given the context and personalities 
involved. (One can only speculate whether had Adolf Hitler survived the war he would 
have been as submissive in the courtroom.) But there are differences between interna-
tional trials then and now. Defendants did not have the full panoply of rights then that 
they are assured of now, with human rights activists ever watchful to ensure that these 
rights are not trampled upon. Moreover, the Nuremberg trials were in large part “paper 
trials,” depending less on live witnesses than carloads of documents. That amount of 
direct linkage evidence is seldom available in contemporary trials. But even more impor-
tant, advanced technology makes it far more attractive to current political and military 
leaders to seize the opportunity to broadcast their propaganda across the globe. I was 
in Cambodia during preparations for the Khmer Rouge trials and was able to watch 
proceedings of the Saddam Hussein trial held in Iraq on television in my hotel, a feat 
that could not have occurred during the Nuremberg trial.
Given all its other deficiencies which complicate any causal analysis, the Saddam 
Hussein trial by a special Iraqi court applying international as well as national law must 
still be cited as a recent example of the danger of disorder engendered by joint defen-
dants even under a narrow indictment. The Hussein court, following Iraqi practice, held 
separate trials on separate incidents, rejecting the consolidated approach of the Milosevic 
prosecution. Thus, the trial in which Hussein and seven other high Iraqi officials were 
accused of ordering and executing retaliatory killings for alleged attempts on Hussein’s 
life in 1982 began while pretrial work was still going on as to several other poten-
tial trials against some of the same accused based on separate incidents. The Hussein 
trial was aptly described as “one of the messier trials in legal history.”
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 Saddam Hus-
sein, the ousted president who had apparently followed Milosevic’s trial performance 
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“obsessively” and used the same basic approach to his own, attacked the legitimacy of 
the court which had been specially established to hear his case (the judges were drawn 
solely from the regular Iraqi judiciary): Hussein defended his actions as immune from 
prosecution under the Iraqi Constitution; he demanded obeisance from participants 
(they should stand up when he came into the courtroom and refer to him as president); 
he consistently interrupted the judge and witnesses, boycotted the trial, went on hunger 
strikes, accused his captors of torture, shouted invectives at the judge, prosecutor, and 
witnesses, and even berated his codefendants for their in-court testimony. Several of 
his codefendants, particularly Saddam’s half-brother, followed suit, and their retained 
counsel joined in the boycotts and outbursts. Retained counsel in the main made argu-
ments as to the illegitimacy of the tribunal and objected to what they deemed procedural 
unfairness to their clients; standby counsel appointed by the court argued finer points 
of evidence and the merits of the case. Hussein basically confessed to the charges in his 
own in-court statement given late in the trial.
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 One of the negative lessons to be taken 
from the Hussein trial is that a determined accused can disrupt any trial, whatever its 
focus or scope, unless he is controlled by the judges, not an easy task but made harder 
in the case of supportive codefendants. 
But it must be stressed, joint trials do not necessarily equate with long trials. Many 
ICTY trials with up to six or seven defendants have undoubtedly saved time from sepa-
rate trials and have been completed in a reasonable time, under a year. The Omarska 
trial of five mid-level prison camp affiliates accused of atrocities committed on inmates, 
in which I participated, lasted 113 actual trial days (less than six months) conducted over 
nearly a year and a half in a courtroom shared on off days with another major trial. 
Preventing the 10 defense counsel from peppering witnesses with identical questions 
asked by other counsel and occasionally from making provocative comments about the 
witnesses was integral to balancing the rights of the accused with the rights of victims 
and moving the trial along. Even though we were not dealing with senior leaders who 
represented themselves, keeping disruptions at bay with so many accused, prosecutors, 
and defense counsel within the small courtroom required constant vigilance and rapid 
responses to avoid inherent conflict between the participants.
III. Judicial Control of the
 Proceedings
A.  Requirements for the Judge
The judge is the lynchpin in securing a fair and expeditious trial, a role doubly difficult 
in leadership cases. His or her principal job is guiding the other participants through 
the process so that the judge(s) (or in national trials, the jury) may arrive at a fair ver-
dict in view of the evidence and the relevant law. That job is by no means confined to 
restraining unruly defendants or their counsel, but includes minimizing the justifiable 
complaints defendants may have about the fairness of the trial. In the 1970s, Dorsen 
and Friedman identified numerous instances in which the actions of the prosecutor or 
the judge significantly contributed to the disruptive behavior of high-profile defendants 
in the United States. Prosecutors in the Chicago 7 trial made provocative remarks in the 
courtroom about the defendants, calling them “liars and obscene haters,” “evil men,” 
and “violent anarchists.”
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 Such remarks coming from a prosecutor, the authors pointed 
out, carry more weight than similar remarks from a defense attorney—especially in a 
jury trial—and they maintain prosecutors should be held to an even higher standard 
in their courtroom behavior than defense counsel. Outside the court, prosecutors have 
sometimes engaged in the problematic practice of discussing evidence with the press, 
another disfavored tactic guaranteed to raise defendants’ and their counsels’ ire. Pros-
ecutors, however, have rarely been held in contempt of court in U.S. courts for disrup-
tive or provocative behavior.
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 In the international leader trials, verbal attacks on the 
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prosecutor made by the defendants or their counsel have been standard fare. While the 
prosecutors may be sorely tried, ultimately they too must be held to a high standard of 
restraint in the quest for an orderly trial.
i.  The Role of Experience and Personality
Ultimately, however, there is wide consensus that “the personality of the judge is the 
pivotal factor” in a fair and expeditious trial.
35
 The need for experienced judges to be 
assigned to these cases is paramount, a view espoused by both prosecutors and defense 
counsel and echoed by at least one ICTY judge.
36
 But the system by which ICTY judges 
are chosen puts no premium on their individual qualifications by way of practical expe-
rience in a courtroom setting. One judge interviewed estimates only about half of the 
ICTY judges have the requisite kind of trial experience needed for the leader trials. No 
training in the kind of special courtroom management required in these trials is offered. 
In order to run an orderly trial of long and complex cases, judges need training in mak-
ing allocations of time necessary for examinations in chief and on cross, reducing time 
spent on procedural motions, making overall time allocations for each party’s case, 
using written testimony with and without opportunity for cross examination, computing 
the statistics on each party’s use of allocated time, and employing numerous other trial 
management techniques.
37
 Others who have participated in these trials said it was vital 
for judges to feel “comfortable” in the courtroom and to exude confidence in their ability 
to walk the line between over-leniency and undue harshness, both of which promote 
acting up by defendants anxious to show the world that they, not the judges, control 
the scene.
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Surprisingly, the experience or inexperience of individual judges appears not to 
be an acknowledged factor in assigning cases to chambers in most international courts. 
Senior judges preside as a matter of course and cases are assigned to chambers without 
apparent regard to the experience of the judges therein. Encouragingly, the Rome Stat-
ute establishing the International Criminal Court makes provision for a predominant 
number of judges with courtroom experience to be assigned to the pretrial and trial 
chambers.
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 In the federal courts in the United States, judges are provided workshops 
in managing terrorist-related trials and a useful compilation of case studies is provided 
to them by the Federal Judicial Center.
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There is little question but that in protracted and chronically disrupted trials a 
personal antagonism may arise between the beleaguered judge and the disgruntled 
defendants or their counsel that can infect fatally the entire proceeding. The Chicago 
7 trial, characterized by nine months of almost continual outbursts, arguments, and 
“theater” performances, such as draping a North Vietnamese flag over the counsel table, 
culminated in 159 contempt citations. The appellate courts reviewing the trial not only 
vacated the original contempt citations, but reversed the convictions citing, inter alia, 
the “district court’s deprecatory and often antagonistic attitude toward the defense in 
the evidence in the record from the beginning.”
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 In particular, the trial judge, Julius 
Hoffman, had insisted on defendant Bobby Seale proceeding to trial with a substitute 
counsel when his own counsel had to have emergency surgery, a ruling which provoked 
uncontrolled protests from all the defendants and the refusal of the substituted counsel 
to obey the court’s order to take over Seale’s case. The appellate court said that the trial 
judge had not made a sufficient inquiry as to the causes of Seale’s misconduct lead-
ing to the contempt citation or given him an opportunity to make his case for a delay 
until his counsel could return, or alternatively to represent himself. Seale was in fact 
bound and gagged in the courtroom for several days after his outburst, a response the 
substitute counsel assigned to represent him called “medieval torture” and one which 
caused the defendant to refer to the judge as a “fascist dog” and a “lowlife son of a 
bitch.” Other uprisings in the trial occurred when the judge refused to let the defen-
dants’ expert witnesses, Ramsey Clark and Ralph Abernathy, testify about the original 
plans for the Chicago demonstrations. On remanding the contempt citations for new 
hearings, the appellate court stressed that as a basis for contempt misbehavior must 
rise to the level of intended obstruction of the trial, and that “mere disrespect or affront 
to the judge’s sense of dignity will not sustain a citation for contempt.”
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 Judge Harold 
Medina, who tried the American Communist Conspiracy case in a riotous 10-month 
trial in 1949, featuring rapid and frequent exchanges of insults and charges between 
the judge and the 11 defendants and their lawyers, was criticized by U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Felix Frankfurter who dissented from an affirmance of the charges of convictions 
for contempt because of the judge’s “comments [that] plainly reveal personal feeling 




Clearly, it must be excruciating for judges to be subjected to continuous disobe-
dience, lack of respect, provocative and insulting remarks, and delaying tactics day in, 
day out over months or even years. On a human level, their occasional expressions of 
frustration or disgust are understandable, yet nonetheless unacceptable insofar as a fair 
and orderly trial is concerned. The judges themselves risk undermining the integrity 
of the court and the process by reacting in kind to bad behavior by the defendants or 
their lawyers. They must be careful to assure that underlying justifications for the defen-
dants’ eruptions do not exist. While such causes do not excuse excessive behavior by the 
defendants, they can endanger the outcome of the trials on review in higher court and 
the overall perception of the fairness of the trials in the eyes of the public. Experienced 
judges generally have a greater capacity to absorb the antipathy of defendants and to 
steer a middle course in their response to unacceptable behavior.
An American judge who has run several taxing trials of potentially disruptive ter-
rorist defendants emphasized that treating defendants with dignity is essential. They 
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want to use the trial as a vehicle to make a statement to the world about their cause and 
the judge can use this desire as leverage on their behavior. This judge promises them 
an opportunity at the end of the trial to make a full statement of their case and attitude 
toward the proceedings if they behave during it. This approach has apparently worked 
successfully in that judge’s cases, though as discussed later negative control mecha-
nisms are held as a backup. The judge explains to the defendant ahead of time both the 
positive and negative reinforcements in the judicial arsenal so he will be aware of what 
is involved when the judge warns him to calm down.
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ii.  Appearance of Independence and Impartiality
The judge must appear to be fair and not personally antagonistic to the defendants even 
under pressure. But it is equally important that he appear independent and free from 
political influences. This is especially true in leader trials since the defendants invariably 
argue that the prosecutions are themselves politically motivated. Such a tension was 
clearly one of many trouble spots in the much-criticized trial of Saddam Hussein, who 
was tried in a specially established tribunal by regular members of the Iraqi judiciary. 
The proceedings were marred by the appearance (and probably the reality) of politi-
cal interference, causing several judges to resign and to be replaced by the executive 
branch.
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 Only one of the five judges who sat on the original trial court stayed on to the 
end. Two defense lawyers were assassinated during the trial, and others claimed they 
were intimidated into refusing security housing within the Green Zone. The concern 
over whether judges were controlled by the executive served to exacerbate the reaction 
of the defendants and their counsel (including Ramsey Clark, a familiar figure in leader 
trials wherever held) not only to the switch in judges itself but also to other perceived 
unfairnesses, including a claimed refusal to disclose exculpatory material held by the 
prosecution and refusal of the court to let Clark orally argue about the legitimacy of the 
tribunal. Most frustratingly, against the advice of American advisers, the court did not 
rule on the several jurisdictional motions filed by the defense at the beginning of the 
trial which dealt not only with the legitimacy of the tribunal but also with the death pen-
alty, accessibility of the defense to the dossier of the investigative judge, and the issue 
of the defendants’ impunity from ex post facto legislation—all key legal issues going to 
the fundamental fairness of the trial. In the absence of such rulings, the defendants 
and their counsel returned again and again to raise these points by way of interrup-
tion and outbursts. Had the court issued its rulings on those issues in the beginning it 
would have been on much stronger ground to summarily deny later attempts to reargue 
them.
46
 A lesson here is that critical motions on jurisdiction, severance, and admissibil-
ity should be dealt with before trial begins to cut down on the number of contentious 
issues that defendants can plausibly carry on about during trial. Fortunately, the ICTY 
rules provide for many such motions to be decided and appealed before trial.
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 As it was, 
defense lawyers in the Hussein trial who thought the judges were controlled by political 
forces readily turned to boycotts in protest against the lack of opportunity to argue these 
points. Although the Iraqi judges received fairly intense training from American lawyers 
dispatched to Baghdad for that purpose, the training did not reportedly include how to 
respond to walkouts and boycotts.
The Hussein trial also presented further difficulties with regards to allegations of 
political bias. Because the Iraqi tribunal had been created specifically for these trials, its 
funding came through the political branches, not the regular judiciary budget. Addition-
ally, some potential judges were disqualified because of Debaathification rules giving 
rise to a widespread notion that Ahmad Chalabi, who was in control of implementing 
the rules, was using his power to pick the judges. Court schedules and trial dates were 
announced through the prime minister’s office because the court had no official spokes-
person of its own.
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 The Hussein trial was beset by other crises and disputes too numer-
ous to mention, but the perception that the judges were not acting independently was 
seen by many to be an important factor in spurring on the acknowledgedly outrageous 
behavior of the defendants and their counsel throughout the trial.
iii.  Setting the Framework for an Orderly Trial
Dorsen and Friedman argue that “ultimately the problem of courtroom disorder is one 
which the trial judge must solve. He must anticipate potentially disruptive behavior and 
take steps to avoid it.”
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 When, despite his best efforts, a trial judge is confronted with 
disruption, he must respond, but his first line of defense is to set the framework for 
a fair and efficient trial in which neither his affirmative actions nor his neglect is the 
cause giving rise to the disruption. Boas suggests the judge set the stage for an orderly 
trial in four ways: (1) a careful review of the indictment and active intervention if he feels 
the scope of the prosecutor’s case will make for an unmanageable trial; if permitted, 
the judge should hold an adversarial hearing on the indictment in which defendants’ 
challenges to the sufficiency of the supporting evidence will be heard and ruled upon; 
(2) pretrial submissions and meetings with the parties to ascertain agreement on facts, 
clarify ambiguous positions, and familiarize the parties and counsel with one another 
and the judge and, it is to be hoped, create some trust among them; (3) taking specific 
steps toward refining trial preparation, i.e., making final rulings on agreed facts, num-
ber of witnesses, possible deletion of parts of the indictment, challenges to evidence; 
and (4) holding a final pretrial conference to allocate overall time limits to both sides 
and limits on crimes and crime sites that will be offered in evidence. Courts, accord-
ing to Boas, should be given authority to fine-tune prosecution and defense proffers 
in all these areas.
50
 The current ICTY Rule 73bis(D)–(F) appears on its face to provide 
that authority, although there has been some tension between the prosecutor and the 
court as to how specifically the court can control what proof is offered or which charges 
T Y R A N T S  O N  T R I A L    2 5
2 6    J U D I C I A L  C O N T R O L  O F  T H E  P R O C E E D I N G S
are made in the indictment.
51
 In the ICC’s first trial in the Lubanga case, judges have 
utilized the broad powers granted in article 64 of the ICC Statute to insure a fair and 
expeditious trial to proactively refine the issues and allocate the parties’ time before the 
proceedings begin.
52
Some ICTY judges who have presided over leader trials stress the absolute neces-
sity of judicial authority to limit the number of witnesses (Milosevic sought initially to 
call 1,500) and crime sites. Similarly, they believe the judge should be able to insist that, 
after investigating the reliability of its source and content and the process by which it 
was compiled, a summary of evidence may be substituted for individual witness testi-
mony when the summary evidence involves the commission of the crimes rather than 
the defendants’ linkage to those crimes.
53
 Major portions of trial time are currently spent 
on these crime base issues. One ICTY prosecutor would go further and have the facts or 
circumstances of the commission of the crimes adjudicated by truth commissions and 
their reports allowed in evidence, as was done in the Nuremberg trials.
54
 Alternatively, 
as in the civil law system, an investigative judge might prepare a decision on the crime 
basis part of the case, subject to challenge in the trial itself.
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iv.  Continuity of Judges and Establishing Ground Rules
The optimal situation in a leader case insofar as judicial control is concerned is thought 
by some to be continuity of judge or judges throughout the pretrial and into the trial 
process.
56
 Otherwise, the trial judges late in the game may reject agreements already 
reached pretrial or place new restrictions on the number of witnesses or sites that the 
pretrial judge allowed. It is interesting that defendant outbursts often occur in these 
pretrial sessions as well as at trial when the accused perceives injustice or unfair treat-
ment. Disruptive pretrial behavior is surely a precursor to trial anarchy. Some of the 
ad hoc courts can and do provide continuity of judges in the pretrial and trial stages, 
but others, like the ICC, structure chambers so that judges are assigned to pretrial or 
trial chambers for discrete periods of time. Dorsen and Friedman add that in cases of 
multiple defendants at the pretrial conference, the respective responsibilities of counsel 
and deadlines for submissions should be firmly settled.
57
 Judges suggest that in cases 
where there is likelihood of disruptive behavior, the defendants and counsel should be 
told the ground rules of what the judge expects by way of tolerated behavior and what 
actions the court is likely to take if its rules are disobeyed.
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B.  Rapid Responses: Too Harsh or Too Lenient?
It is of course expected that even with a focused indictment and careful judicial prepara-
tion for an orderly trial, persistent leaders intent on using the courtroom as a stage to 
play for history will engage in disruptive activities. How should the judges then react? 
Ignore the unruly defendants as long as possible and continue proceedings or rapidly 
respond with tough sanctions to show who’s boss? Over the years judges in high-profile 
cases have been criticized as too reflexively harsh (Judge Medina in the Communist 
Conspiracy trial, Judge Hoffman in the Chicago 7 trial) or too lenient (the Milosevic trial 
judges, the first judge in the Hussein trial); a few seem to have found the right balance 
(Judge Leonie Brinkema in the 9/11 trial United States v. Moussaoui). There are a variety 
of sanctions judges can impose on recalcitrant defendants and their lawyers, but all of 
them have disadvantages as well as advantages and, when used too often, appear to lose 
their effectiveness. Trials in absentia or permanent removal of the defendant from the 
courtroom would probably be the most effective sanction for consistently disruptive 
behavior, but no international judge has ventured to go so far, probably because of the 
recognition in most countries and in court statutes of a defendant’s right to be tried in 
his presence in a public trial.
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i.  Removal of Defendants
The authority of a court to remove a defendant temporarily from the courtroom after 
warning and usually after lesser sanctions have proven unsuccessful has been repeat-
edly upheld by national and international courts (although with the reservation that 
arrangements be made for the accused to follow the trial and consult by audio with 
counsel representing him).
60
 Judges have invariably let removed defendants back into 
the courtroom after brief periods of removal, on their promise to behave. In Illinois v. 
Allen, the first U.S. Supreme Court case allowing removal,
61
 the defendant at trial had 
argued repeatedly with the judge over jury selection; told jurors there was “not going to 
be no trial. . . . I’m going to keep talking all through the trial,” threatened the judge with 
“you’re going to be the corpse here,” and threw papers on the floor. The U.S. Supreme 
Court, in its 1970 opinion in the case, ruled that removal was not a violation of the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness against him in a public trial 
because, after being warned that removal will follow a repetition of his disruptive con-
duct, he “insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive and disre-
spectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.”
62
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ii.  Physical Sanctions 
A federal appellate court in the Chicago 7 case had sanctioned binding and gagging 
the defendant to keep him quiet, but this tactic, though not declared constitutionally 
impermissible, was specifically criticized by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Allen case 
as an “affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is 
seeking to uphold.”
63
 As best as I can learn, gagging has not been used since, although 
handcuffing to prevent physical violence or flight is still used in U.S. courts occasion-
ally, and defendants are sometimes still shackled to the floor, although care is taken so 
the jury will not observe the restraints by seating him before the public or jurors are 
brought into the courtroom. The use of a “stun belt” or “stun bracelet” has also been 
reported in American courts. It would deliver a shock to the defendant—after a judicial 
warning—that could be strong enough to disrupt his bodily functions thereby produc-
ing a loss of the dignity he craves.
64
 I am unaware of physical restraints being used in 
an international court.
iii.  Contempt
The inherent power of courts to find defendants and their lawyers in contempt for 
unruly behavior is commonly employed, but for leaders facing possible life imprison-
ment or execution for their principal crimes and hell-bent on making their case to the 
world before they go, the additional sanction of some extra prison time is not likely to 
have a strong deterrent effect. In recent trials, cutting off the defendant’s microphone 
or arranging for televised dissemination to be stopped or deferred is also used. If the 
defendant is representing himself (to be discussed at much greater length in the next 
section), counsel may be assigned to take over the case after other sanctions have proved 
ineffective. Recesses can be called so everyone has a chance to cool off. The court may 
move into closed session. No single response or set of responses has proven foolproof 
against a calculatedly disruptive defendant. The problem is always how to balance the 
defendant’s right to a fundamentally fair trial with the interests of victims and the wider 
community in seeing that justice is done and is seen to be done.
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iv.  Sanctioning Misbehavior of Counsel
Most disruptive behavior comes from the defendants and not their counsel, although 
in several leader trials the counsel have joined their clients or initiated unruly behavior 
on their own. There have also reportedly been instances in the Rwanda tribunal where 
prosecution and defense counsel have shouted loud and long at each other, with little 
or no intervention from judges, who appeared incapable of controlling the courtroom.
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When lawyers misbehave there are court rules as well as professional rules and disci-
plinary mechanisms, along with contempt, that can be imposed.
67
 International courts 
usually are required by statute to require lawyers appearing before them to comply 
with the court’s own Code of Professional Conduct.
68
 Ultimately, the judge can have the 
lawyer removed from the case for misconduct and recommend he be eliminated from 
the roster of lawyers eligible to practice before the court.
69
 Most defense lawyers have 
careers to pursue when the instant trial is over and are not so rooted as their clients 
in the outcome of any single trial. When lawyers misbehave it is more likely to involve 
refusal to heed judges’ orders to either cease a particular argument or stop trying to 
introduce evidence already held to be inadmissible rather than misbehavior such as 
interrupting or insulting the judge or prosecutor.
70
 The Chicago 7 and the Hussein trials 
are, however, exceptions, featuring brazen epithets hurled at the judges by counsel. The 
question has arisen whether lawyers have an obligation to dissuade their clients from 
misbehaving, and on this one the legal experts and even courts are split. They agree 
lawyers should privately counsel their clients to stay within the rules, but whether they 
have to publicly criticize their clients or remonstrate with them in the courtroom to stop 
disruptive behavior is more controversial. The lawyer does have a duty to tell the client 
in private about the consequences of his disruptive behavior, seek to dissuade him, and 
certainly not to encourage him.
71
v.  The Dorsen/Friedman Typology of Sanctioning Disruptions
Dorsen and Friedman, over 30 years ago, identified five types of disruption which they 
defined as “intentional conduct that interferes substantially with the dignity, order and 
decorum of the proceedings,” and recommended different judicial responses to the 
five categories.
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 The first type is “passive disrespect,” shown through such activities as 
refusing to stand when the judge enters or refusing to address him as “Your Honor” 
(Milosevic persisted in calling the judges “Mister,” which the court ignored); the sec-
ond type is “refusal to cooperate” with the rules of procedure, i.e., to submit required 
filings; the third is a “single obscenity or shout”; the fourth is repeated interruptions 
of the judge, prosecutor, or witnesses; and the fifth is physical violence. The authors 
advise largely ignoring the first (passive disrespect). As to the second, they recommend 
attempting to find the source of the defendant’s failure to cooperate and reasoning 
with him, warning him of sanctions if he persists. For the third form of disruption—
a single isolated shout or obscenity—they advise a warning not to repeat, but if the 
defendants continue with the fourth—frequent interruptions or outbursts—citation for 
contempt after a warning or even temporary removal is advised. If physical violence 
occurs, handcuffs, immediate contempt, and/or exclusion is called for. The authors 
stress none of these category-based responses should be automatic, however; the judge 
has to look at each case in its own context. Consideration should be given, for instance, 
to whether repeated interruptions occur close together as part of one episode or over 
an extended period of time; whether they occur at critical phases such as sentencing, or 
routinely during ordinary trial sequences; what the effect will be on other defendants; 
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and whether there were provocations for the misbehavior. Judicial responses should nor-
mally be escalated as bad behavior continues. Severance of the obstreperous defendant 
may be called for in a multiple defendant trial. Contempt should almost always precede 
removal, but there is “no talismanic formula for when contempt should be applied and 
when it is unnecessary.”
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Bench conferences should be frequent and warnings repeated, especially as to the 
imminence of contempt and removal. Disruptive activity often comes in the course of 
witness examinations and defendants can be barred from directly addressing the wit-
nesses if they have counsel. Additionally, in the case of a powerful and intimidating self-
representing defendant like Slobodan Milosevic, the court might consider appointing an 
intermediary in conducting the cross-examination of victim-witnesses, so they are not 
revictimized on the stand by the very person they hold responsible for the devastation 
in their lives. With, for example, Milosevic asking the question and an intermediary 
relaying the question to the victim-witness, one layer of protection is added to the victim 
without jeopardizing the right of the accused to confront his witness. This limits the 
ability of self-representing leaders to bully and intimidate survivors, or even underlings, 
in court. As Ellen Lutz and Caitlin Reiger point out in Prosecuting Heads of State: 
  In cases of high-level commanders, establishing superior criminal responsibility requires 
proving an unbroken chain of command, and that usually involves the testimony of witnesses 
from inside the very command structure that the accused once controlled. Former leaders 
frequently continue to enjoy the support of segments of such national institutions as the 
armed forces. Hence, cross-examination of a former subordinate by his one-time commander 
can be not only intimidating but threatening and can lead to silence, perjury, or other ways 
of undermining evidence that the prosecution needs to prove its case.
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vi.  Sanctions in Leader Trials
The international trials of leader defendants may call for a firmer hand than described 
in Dorsen and Friedman’s typology. According to one ICTY judge, “these defendants 
may have power and money” and can indirectly pull levers through their connections 
outside the court that affect what goes on inside the court.
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 On the other hand, Judge 
Theodor Meron of the ICTY has said: “Any court dealing with atrocities has to pay 
particular respect to due process. There can be no cutting corners.”
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 On a pragmatic 
basis, if it does cut any, a myriad of international NGOs will almost surely be at its heels. 
But there is always the question of what due process requires and at what point the 
competing interests of the victims and the integrity of the court come into the picture. 
There are those who believe that the international courts, like national judicial systems, 
are built upon the premise of law-abiding participants: professional lawyers, whose 
careers are bound up in making the process work smoothly, and defendants who in the 
final analysis realize their fate lies in the court’s hands and do not want to antagonize 
it unnecessarily. That kind of system, they say, simply is not able to deal with clever, 
unscrupulous deposed leaders who have no interest or reason to honor its procedures 
but rather seek to use it as a vehicle for their own political or historical enhancement. 
In the end, however, most participants I interviewed agree that smart and experienced 
judges can make the system work, but that such judges are not always put in control. 
Even when they are put in control, their hands have sometimes been tied by overly 
restrictive appellate rulings as to what they can do and when. 
The Milosevic trial is again cited as an example. Milosevic constantly interrupted 
counsel and witnesses; corrected interpreters; defied the authority of the tribunal or 
the judges; refused to comply with orders to disclose materials, file witness lists or 
produce experts; eschewed written submissions, insisting that only oral evidence was 
appropriate in a public trial; required for health reasons a minimal courtroom schedule 
(four hours a day, three days a week); ignored repeated admonitions by judges not to 
ask leading questions; sought to introduce irrelevant information into the record; and 
played blackmail with the court by getting defense witnesses to refuse to appear if he 
could not examine them himself.
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 One observer commented: “A curious feature of the 
Milosevic case is the extent to which orders of the trial court were not complied with.”
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Early on it was clear Milosevic would conduct himself in an obstructionist manner 
even though prosecutors had originally expected him to be passive and had calculated 
the predicted length of the trial on that basis. Boas thinks the Milosevic judges should 
have been tougher and insisted more on compliance with their orders and rules, i.e., 
ICTY rules that allow the court not to hear a witness or admit evidence which has not 
been disclosed before trial.
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 Although allotted an overall time limit in which to present 
his defense, 80 percent of that time had been used up without any significant part of 
it responding to the prosecutor’s Bosnia/Croatia case when he died. His late-in-the-day 
request for an additional 380 hours to cover those indictments was refused, although 
he was granted a substantial recess to continue preparation.
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The former Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte recalls her frustration with the 
Milosevic trial and his self-representation: 
  On August 31, 2004, Courtroom 1 sprang to life once again as Milosevic began presenting 
his defense case. True to form, he mounted no legal defense in the conventional sense. 
Rather, he chose to dabble in politics and to make speeches to his true believers in Serbia and 
elsewhere about his interpretation of Yugoslavia’s break demise. . . . [A]s the months wore 
on, the judges found themselves facing a terrible quandary: the time allotted for the defense 
case was running out, and Milosevic was neglecting to present any discernible defense for the 
two components of the prosecution’s case that were arguably its strongest: the indictments 
derived from crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia. This incredible 
situation, I thought, would never have arisen if the Trial Chamber had forced Milosevic to 
accept appointed defense counsel from the beginning.
81
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In the court’s defense, it tried for more dramatic solutions like severing the 
Kosovo indictment (twice) and later imposing counsel on Milosevic, but in both cases 
those efforts were thwarted by the appellate chamber. There is, currently, some ques-
tion as to how much the more moderate micromanagement techniques discussed above 
would have worked after these big guns had been withdrawn. As long as Milosevic 
remained at the helm in a seemingly endless trial conducted on a “banker’s hours” 
schedule, the court projected a disheartening sense of powerlessness, a coup which 
doubled Milosevic’s own popularity at home: “The judicial proceedings at The Hague 
transformed Milosevic from a disgraced politician who had been ousted by a popular 
revolt into one of the most esteemed public figures in Serb history.”
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The Hussein trial generated widespread reports focused on his misbehavior: “Mr. 
Hussein and his fellow defendants unleashing long diatribes against the court and the 
American role in Iraq”; “the former dictator’s televised displays of defiance can only 
embolden his followers in the insurgency”;
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 “he disobeys [the judge] with impunity”; 
“marchers said they are emboldened by his courtroom bravado”;
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 “the trial has been too 
widely perceived within Iraq and abroad as a chaotic and politicized process with many 
serious flaws carried out by inexperienced judges.”
85
 Michael Scharf writes that the origi-
nal judge was “pressured to resign as too weak to control the defendants; a second one 
engaged in angry shouting matches and frequent ejections from the courtroom,” and 
seven codefendants and a dozen lawyers “regularly disparaged the judges, interrupted 
witness testimony with outbursts, turned examination into political diatribes and staged 
frequent walk-outs and boycotts.”
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In truth, all available responses appear to have been tried by one or another 
of the Iraqi presiding judges. Defendants were removed from the courtroom several 
times for calling the judges “dictator,” “daughter of adultery,” engaging in loud praying, 
reading from the Koran, speaking out of turn. The judges also dismissed abusive 
private defense counsel and imposed assigned counsel against defendants’ will. None 
of the standard responses appeared to work to produce a smooth trial.
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 Defendants 
and defense lawyers themselves boycotted parts of the trial. Two of the chroniclers 
of the trial wrote that Hussein in his first few minutes in court expected to be ruled 
guilty and executed promptly—when he found out that the trial would be run according 
to rules and procedures, he immediately became bolder and began answering the 
judge back.
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American advisers had counseled the Hussein judges that the defendants should 
not be allowed to speak except as witnesses in the trial since they had counsel, but the 
Iraqi judges disregarded this advice, preferring their own Iraqi practice which allowed 
the defendant with court permission to question witnesses. This was done in the appar-
ent belief that unless the defendants could participate in their own defense and speak 
in open court, Hussein’s trial, also known as the Dujail trial, would not be perceived by 
the outside world as fair: “One of the ironies of the Dujail trial was that its very length 
and the often chaotic atmosphere that was caused by the effort to protect the due process 
rights of the defendants were primary reasons why ordinary Iraqis became increasingly 
skeptical and disillusioned” with the whole process.
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 The Iraqi and American authori-
ties underestimated the power of Hussein’s court persona, as well as the degree to which 
the Iraqi watchers of the first televised trial in the Middle East would not really under-
stand how the process was supposed to work. No one ever explained to them adequately 
the legal principles involved in the trial. As in the Chicago 7 and Milosevic cases, the 
defense strategy was focused on showing the trial was really about bigger international 
geopolitical interests, not the events of the long-ago Dujail incident. 
Saddam Hussein’s trial lasted 37 court days stretched over a nine-month period. 
The second presiding judge in the Hussein trial took a different approach from the first: 
he did not ignore outbursts or display patience or tolerance, such as letting defendants 
wear Muslim headgear and ordering handcuffs removed. The second judge was quicker 
to engage in argumentative exchanges and levy sanctions such as removal. But the sheer 
force of Hussein’s persona had been underestimated. Richard Holbrooke had predicted 
Hussein would appear “pathetic,” but observers commented, “he was cunning, arro-
gant, forceful, at times petulant, but rarely pathetic, and never small.”
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The defense was also upset because witnesses testified behind curtains and their 
identities were revealed to the defense team only on the morning of their testimony. 
And the judges did make one very critical strategic mistake by not permitting any oral 
argument on the issue of the tribunal’s legitimacy until the third day of the trial and 
then delaying any decision until the end of the trial. Defense lawyers staged a walkout 
using the failure to allow successive argument or to decide this issue as their reason. 
Another important strategic error occurred when Hussein was allowed to question wit-
nesses directly (after counsel). When the judges objected because Hussein would not 
limit his intervention to questions but wanted to make speeches, he threatened boycott: 
“Perhaps more than any other decision, this [allowing Hussein to question witnesses] 
would lead to the chaos in the days to follow.”
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 Barzan Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti, Hus-
sein’s half brother and vocal codefendant, constantly interrupted witnesses’ testimony 
as well, objecting to its “truth”; his questioning of witnesses was so abrasive that the 
judge finally required him to put all his questions through the judge (which is the usual 
civil law practice).
Hussein and codefendants also claimed they were tortured in detention.
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 The 
judge ordered an investigation into the allegation, but no report of the investigation was 
ever issued publicly and this fueled speculation as to the motives behind the trial. The 
first presiding judge was attacked in the press and behind the scenes in political quar-
ters as too lenient, and he eventually responded to pressure to step down. It was thought 
he had not exuded enough confidence in his own ability to control the courtroom, had 
T Y R A N T S  O N  T R I A L    3 3
3 4    J U D I C I A L  C O N T R O L  O F  T H E  P R O C E E D I N G S
not cut off the defendants’ microphones quickly enough when they strayed. An abortive 
attempt was made at naming a successor, who was rejected for Baath Party member-
ship, before a second judge took over and pursued a stricter regimen, i.e., removing 
Barzan Ibrahim for not sitting down when ordered to. This sanction, however, provoked 
shouts and curses from Hussein (“Down with America! Down with the traitor!”) and 
threats from defendants and their lawyers to boycott the trial to which the new judge 
retorted, “If you leave you can’t come back,” announcing he would use “standby law-
yers” to continue the case. The defendants rejected any contacts with the standby law-
yers. Ultimately the retained lawyers for all eight defendants as well as the defendants 
themselves left the courtroom. The judge later ordered the defendants to come back, 
whereupon Barzan Ibrahim, Hussein’s codefendant, appeared in his underwear and sat 
with his back to the judge. At other times, Hussein took prayer breaks in the middle of 
testimony; called the judge “son of a whore,” a traitor, and a homosexual; announced a 
hunger strike which resulted in his being force-fed by IV; and his defense team asked 
for the dismissal of the judge and prosecutor, complaining to the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission in Geneva of human rights violations in the trial.
At the end of the prosecution’s case, Hussein asked to address the court. Accord-
ing to Michael A. Newton and Michael P. Scharf, “[t]he next five minutes were the most 
important of the entire trial”: Hussein admitted he had ordered the destruction of the 
orchards and homes and the arrest and execution of the townspeople in Dujail by say-
ing, “I’m responsible.” He argued later what he did was not unlike what the United 
States had done in bombing Iraq in 1993 after the plot to assassinate the first President 
Bush—“no investigation, no trial, no wait to clarify. . . .”
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 At other points, he accused 
the court of corruption and raised the specter of American abuses in Abu Ghraib. These 
issues were not on trial and the judge rightly cut off his microphone and ordered a 
closed session.
During the trial itself, the defense submitted successive different lists of witnesses 
to the judge’s patent frustration—in the end 56 were allowed to testify. The prosecution 
had presented 28 witnesses.
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 Three witnesses for the defense claimed that the prosecu-
tor had tried to bribe them to testify against Saddam. A video, however, was produced 
which showed a witness to have misidentified the prosecutor as the one offering bribes. 
After admitting the defense counsel had coached them and promised them rewards for 
so testifying, the witnesses were cited for perjury.
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The defense team announced they would boycott closing arguments, which were 
ultimately conducted by standby lawyers, even after Hussein threatened them, stating: 
“If you present the argument I will consider you my personal enemy and an enemy of 
the state.” Hussein also engaged the judge in an amazing colloquy. Hussein: “You hear 
the sound of weapons . . . this is the sound of the people. Let us see how the Americans 
will face the people.” Judge: “You are provoking the killing of people by car bombs. . . . 
If you are urging to kill Americans, let your friends or the mujahideen attack the Ameri-
can camps and not blow themselves up in the streets and public places and cafes and 
markets. Let them blow up Americans.”
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At the end, Hussein interrupted the judge’s reading of the guilty verdict and had to 
have his microphone volume lowered.
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 No written opinion issued from the court until 
two weeks later (and then it was 300 pages).
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 Some critics like Human Rights Watch 
pronounced the trial “fundamentally unfair” primarily because the pretrial motions 
had not been resolved before trial, defense was presented with a 1,100-page file 45 days 
before the trial began, and only 20 trial days had been allotted to each side. The 17-page 
opinion of the appeals chamber issued a few weeks later and upholding the verdict was 
spurned by Human Rights Watch for the “cursory nature of the reasoning”; no inter-
national court cases were cited in it although the crimes the defendants were convicted 
of were based in international law and the tribunal’s charter had instructed them to 
consult international court rulings. One of Hussein’s counsel told reporters later that 
their defense strategy was to prolong the trial and inflame insurgency so that Hussein 
could bargain for freedom as a mediator bringing peace to warring factions.
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The Hussein trial demonstrates that even where the deposed leader is represented 
by his own counsel, strong confident actions by the judges are needed to keep control 
of the courtroom. Those actions must of course still allow the defendant and/or his 
counsel to present their witnesses and evidence in an orderly way and to refute the 
prosecution. My impression is that none of the “control” techniques used by the Iraqi 
judges, such as temporary removal from the courtroom or imposition of standby coun-
sel, and certainly no similar techniques used in the Milosovic trial, impugned basic 
rights of the defendants to make their case. It seems, to the contrary, that the judges in 
these international trials have bent over backward to keep the defendants participating 
in the proceedings. But the judges have made strategic mistakes. In Hussein’s case, 
“Perhaps the most important lesson in this regard is that allowing a former leader to 
act as counsel questioning witnesses and addressing the judge throughout the trial is 
a virtual license for abuse.”
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 In the Hussein trial no clear ground rules were set for 
avoiding or punishing disruptive behavior; in later trials based on different episodes, 
pretrial sessions have been held to cover some of this ground and for whatever rea-
sons—perhaps mainly because Hussein was no longer involved—those trials appear to 
have gone more smoothly.
More forgiving commentators on the Hussein trial, however, concluded war crimes 
trials are “inherently messy,” even divisive rather than comforting to the war-scarred 
population involved in the short term: “To date, not one has been praised as a model of 
fairness, efficiency or decorum”; 75 percent of Serbs didn’t think Milosevic got a fair trial; 
80 percent of contemporary Germans thought Nuremberg was an act of retribution; it 
is fair to surmise the numbers in Iraq would not be different.
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 But it must be said that 
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the Hussein trial represented a “perfect storm,” collecting in one proceeding virtually 
all the elements conducive to chaos: inadequately trained judges, political intervention, 
mid-trial replacement of the presiding judge, multiple defendants, unprofessional law-
yers, nontransparent and delayed rulings on critical issues, and inconsistent responses 
to outrageous conduct by the defendants—a cornucopia of negative lessons.
In these leadership trials, judges have never imposed sanctions enforceable out-
side the courtroom to compel order inside the court. International trial defendants are 
allowed more privileges than in many national prisons due to UN humane treatment 
standards. In the Yugoslav tribunal, for instance, detainees in the court’s Scheveningen 
detention facilities play volleyball, receive special meals or spices from their homeland, 
and are allowed conjugal visits and frequent phone calls. It might be worth experiment-
ing with threatening to take away some of these privileges as a sanction for continued 
misbehavior in court. 
Dorsen and Friedman also counsel occasional loosening of the rules to reward 
good behavior: In the prosecution of Angela Davis for murder and conspiracy arising out 
of a courthouse shooting, the defendant, who was represented by counsel, was allowed 
to cross-examine witnesses, argue as a cocounsel, and listen in on bench conferences. 
The defense was allowed to discuss background racial conflict issues in statements to 
the jury, though under a strict relevance standard that could have been refused.
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 Before 
such privileges are given, however, the judge needs to be sure that the defendant is act-
ing in good faith and not simply exploiting the court’s good will. 
IV. The Right to Self-Representation
A.  Why Do They Do It?
Senior national and paramilitary leaders have increasingly insisted on representing 
themselves in international court trials. One might ask, Why? These are long, compli-
cated, legally sophisticated proceedings and none of the leaders have had past experi-
ence with courtroom proceedings. Obviously they do not seek the same goals from a 
trial as other litigants—a decision based on evidence and legal rules—but rather a plat-
form on which to make their case to homeland audiences and to accuse their accusers 
of crass motives for holding the trials. Conceivably, some leaders might think they can 
do a better job at defending themselves than the lawyers provided whom they instinc-
tively distrust and refuse to cooperate with. On a psychological level, these leaders have 
strong egos and are used to controlling those around them; they have confidence in their 
talents to continue that control even after arrest. The Nuremberg trial itself featured 
long diatribes by Hermann Goering and a refusal to answer questions “Yes” or “No.” 
Though he engaged in no physical antics or boycotts other than “gesturing, mugging 
and muttering contempt on the proceedings,” he did manage a tour de force perfor-
mance during direct examination by Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson, a dialogue which 
most commentators called in Goering’s favor.
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In modern international trials, attempts to comply with demands for self-rep-
resentation and to run a fair and efficient trial have collided drastically. Apart from 
their inevitable lack of familiarity with rules of evidence and procedure, self-represented 
defendants have complicated the trials by their emotional outbursts and muted the 
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court’s responses because, not being lawyers, they are not subject to the same code of 
professional ethics as lawyers. This is unfortunate because “obstructionist behavior by 
a self-representing accused is no more tolerable than it is by an accused who is repre-
sented.”
  The purposes that led to the establishment of international criminal tribunals must not be 
thwarted by self-representing accused acting with the approval and acquiescence of trial 
chambers, which may view the right of an accused to represent himself as so fundamental 
that it trumps the interests of the international community to a fair trial on the merits.
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The lengths to which the ICTY courts have felt they must go to insure the self-
represented defendant gets a fair trial have made those trials extremely costly, time-con-
suming, and some would say legally convoluted. According to judges, prosecutors, and 
registry officials interviewed, the system—or shall I say the practice—as it now exists 
“doesn’t work.”
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 Most participants interviewed were unhappy with it, and it certainly 
provides no model for later courts to follow. A brief history of the ICTY experience is 
set out below to explain how the court reached its current dilemma.
B.  The ICTY in Impasse
i.  The Milosevic Story
Milosevic declared an intention to represent himself at his earlier pretrial appearances 
where he also displayed his proclivity to interrupt, preach, and run the show as much 
as the court would allow. Former Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte describes in her 
memoir her views on Milosevic’s self-representation:
  Milosevic announced that he would defend himself in court. The trial’s presiding judge, 
Richard May, tried to convince Milosevic that the case would involve voluminous documen-
tary evidence and testimony, making it impossible for him to mount an effective defense 
alone. Milosevic remained obdurate. The prosecution team filed a motion requesting the 
Trial Chamber to require that Milosevic retain defense counsel or to appoint counsel to 
defend him. The Trial Chamber decided instead to allow Milosevic to defend himself, and 
the prosecution team appealed, in vain. Milosevic clearly knew he could not defend himself 
successfully in a legal sense, because he did not bother to mount a legal defense. He chose 
instead to present a political defense, to speak through the window to his nationalist con-
stituents in Serbia, to exploit each trial day as an opportunity for political diatribe. It did not 
have to be this way.
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During most of the next four years, his ill health required constant recesses; 66 
trial days (the equivalent of six months trial time) had to be canceled for health reasons 
and trial days were limited to three days a week, four hours a day. The trial court midway 
through the trial imposed counsel on Milosevic for health reasons. The appellate cham-
ber, however, while upholding the imposition of counsel proceeded so to restrict what 
assigned counsel could do that in effect it undid its affirmance of the trial court’s action. 
The trial court had told assigned counsel to prepare and examine witnesses, submit the 
facts and evidence it thought relevant and seek the orders it deemed necessary, discuss 
with the client the evidence and conduct of the trial and receive his instructions but 
retain the right to take a different course if counsel deemed it strategically practicable. 
The trial chamber also let Milosevic retain the right to examine witnesses himself after 
counsel had conducted direct examination and gave Milosevic the right to pick the 
assigned counsel from the registry’s approved list. Milosevic appealed the trial court’s 
ruling. In the interim, before the appeals chamber ruled, Milosevic took an even tougher 
tack with the court. Witnesses he had called for his defense refused to come if he was 
not allowed to examine them personally, and he himself boycotted the trial. These kinds 
of actions—some would call them “blackmail”—did not go unnoticed, and were later 
replicated by other defendants.
The appeals chamber ruled the trial court’s restrictions on Milosevic’s participa-
tion at the trial were disproportionate to the health-bound reasons given for impos-
ing assigned counsel. Specifically, the appellate court said Milosevic himself must be 
allowed to select witnesses and question them when he was physically able, to argue 
motions himself, make closing arguments, and petition the court on all strategic deci-
sions. In effect, Milosevic could continue to call the shots, and the role of assigned 
counsel was basically reduced to that of standby counsel. In reality, Milosevic refused to 
consult with his appointed counsel at all on selection of witnesses or defense strategy. 
The frustrated assigned counsel subsequently asked to be released but the court refused, 
and the trial continued its labored and uneasy pace under the appeals chamber’s more 
permissive regime, though with a somewhat more pliant Milosevic in charge.
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 Accord-
ing to New York Times reporter Marlise Simons, “once given to bursting into tirades and 
dismissing his indictment as a fake and his trial as a farce, Mr. Milosevic . . . has now 
become steeped in the case’s 200,000 pages. These days, he sits in the dock flanked 
by carts full of binders, which he frequently consults.”
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 The former chief prosecutor’s 
view is that the judges’ failure to control the courtroom in the Milosevic case led to a 
predictable outcome: 
  If, from the beginning, the judges had shown resolve in this regard and required defense 
counsel, Milosevic would have had to concede and surely would have resorted to some fall-
back strategy to politicize the trial. In my opinion, the Trial Chamber’s judges exaggerated 
concerns over a fair trial and created a situation that was unfair to everyone, including Milo-
sevic. The judges’ lack of resolve was a weakness Milosevic exploited immediately. And once 
Milosevic had passed through this looking glass, other accused—notably Slobodan Praljak, 
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a Croat general facing charges linked with Tudjman’s attempt to partition Bosnia and Her-
zegovina; Momcilo Krajisnik, who was appealing a twenty-seven-year sentence for persecu-
tion, extermination, murder, deportation and other charges; and Vojislav Seselj, a rabid Serb 
nationalist and ally of Milosevic who allegedly led a notorious paramilitary unit—would also 
exploit it.
109
In real time, Milosevic had considerable legal assistance of his own choosing in 
representing himself both before and after counsel was assigned. He maintained a staff 
of informed “advisers,” including internationally familiar names such as Ramsey Clark 
and John Livingston, with whom he was allowed to consult in his detention unit and 
who were accorded some of the same privileges as regular counsel; the court had also 
appointed amicus curiae to raise any issues independently before the court they deemed 
necessary for a fair trial. 
ii.  The Status of the Right to Self-Representation
A brief summary and evaluation of the appeals chamber’s seminal ruling in the Milos-
evic case on the right of a defendant to represent himself is in order here. The appellate 
chamber’s recognition of a defendant’s right to self-represent as “fundamental” in the 
Milosevic case was based on its interpretation of article 21(4)(d) of the ICTY statute, 
which provides the defendant with a right “to be tried in his presence, and to defend 
himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing.” Drawing heavily 
on U.S. Supreme Court decisions which recognize the right to self-representation as 
rooted in English ancestral and early state practices and hence inferable as a funda-
mental right at the time the U.S. Constitution was adopted,
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 the chamber termed it 
a “cornerstone” right in international law as well. Although the right was revocable 
when it became irreconcilable with a fair trial according to the appeals chamber, it was 
nonetheless presumptively available to defendants and not easily to be refused or taken 
away regardless of impediments it posed to the defendant’s own chances of success or 
to the optimal management of the trial: “[It] may never be in an individual’s interest to 
represent himself . . . but he nonetheless has a ‘cornerstone’ right to make his own case 
to the Tribunal.”
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 Though the right could be restricted “for substantially and persis-
tently obstructing prudent and expeditious conduct of his trial,” the restriction “must be 
limited to the minimum extent necessary to protect the Tribunal’s interest in assuring 
a reasonably expeditious trial.”
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This right to self-representation is by no means a universally accepted one nor 
is it part of customary international law. Many nations, including Bosnia, France, Italy, 
and Iraq, do not recognize it. The European Court of Human Rights has not declared it 
a “fundamental right.” In the eyes of many international legal systems, it is the right to 
have counsel, not the right not to have counsel, which is the fundamental bedrock of a 
fair trial. Even within the ICTY, judges disagree about the scope and priority that should 
be accorded to the right over other aspects of a fair trial. Judge Schomburg wrote a “Fun-
damentally Dissenting Opinion” on the existence of the right to self-representation in 
the Krajisnik case, opening with this salvo: “If I were tasked to show that international 
criminal jurisdiction cannot work I would draft the decision in the same way as was 
done by the majority of the Appeals Chamber.”
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 In the Krajisnik case, a majority of the 
appellate chamber had again reaffirmed the right of a leader to represent himself, this 
time on appeal. Schomburg went on to declare: “There is no fair procedure before inter-
national tribunals without public legal assistance.”
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 Labeling the “decision in this case” 
as a “glaring example in a long line of unfortunate decisions by the appellate chamber,” 
Schomburg, though focusing on Krajisnik’s right on appeal, made clear his opposition 
to its recognition in trial as well. His comparative study of the status of such a right 
around the world found that many countries did not recognize the right, and even those 
that did were generous in recognizing exceptions where its exercise interfered with a 
fair or expeditious trial.
Schomburg argued that even if the right to self-representation is generally recog-
nized, it should be amenable to denial or revocation based on the nature of the proceed-
ings as well as the health or behavior of the defendant. ICTY Rule 45 itself allows the 
court to assign counsel “in the interests of justice.” In the Krajisnik appeal, the defendant 
faced a 27-year sentence and 27,000 pages of trial transcript, as well as “sophisticated 
case law” and complicated appellate procedures. The theory of the prosecution—joint 
criminal enterprise—was itself a complex and controversial doctrine, a “legal concept 
unknown in the defendant’s home country.” Substantial delays would be inevitable if he 
represented himself. The appellate chamber had ruled in Krajisnik that an amicus curiae 
would be appointed to basically keep an eye on the proceedings to insure all relevant 
arguments were raised on the defendant’s part. Schomburg found the appointment of 
amicus as “de facto counsel” a distortion of the traditional function of that office, and 
the defendants’ use of his own behind-the-scenes “undercover counsel” irreconcilable 
with the fundamental principle of a public trial.
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In the United States as well, there are judges who disagree with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s broad articulation of the right. As Judge Schomburg pointed out, Judge Rein-
hardt of the Ninth Circuit has written to that effect—and the U.S. Supreme Court has 
itself refused to broaden the constitutional right to an appeal setting as the ICTY has 
done.
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 Others interviewed, including ICTY judges, have difficulties understanding and 
embracing what they perceive of as an “absolutist” American perspective of the right to 
self-represent, which amounts in many instances to the “right to an unfair trial,” and 
add that, even in the United States, judges would not apply the right to self-representa-
tion to situations where the ICTY appellate chambers has insisted on it.
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An American judge interviewed, who has presided over terrorist trials, is of the 
view that the Faretta decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on which the ICTY appellate 
court relied so heavily “went too far.” This judge believes that letting a defendant, par-
ticularly one detained, represent himself in a complex trial with massive fact finding is 
“like shooting fish in a barrel.” It is unfair both to the accused and to the rest of the trial 
participants and the public. Where a death penalty or even a long sentence is involved, 
and the facts are complex, the accused should not be allowed to represent himself.
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Apart from his inability to integrate and collect evidence, such a defendant cannot usu-
ally have access to classified information, which in American terrorist trials makes up 
the lion’s share of evidence. Indeed, in the Moussaoui case (the alleged 20th hijacker of 
9/11), the defendant who did represent himself for part of the proceeding appealed on 
the ground that his denial of access to classified information during that period made 
it impossible for him to prepare an adequate case.
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This trial judge explains carefully to defendants who claim the right to represent 
themselves the disadvantages they face. The judge, as a matter of course, also appoints 
standby counsel who, if cleared, can access the classified information, and attempts to 
find standby counsel who speak the accused’s language and to whom they can relate. 
The fact remains, however, that in the United States, as in international courts, the 
accused are likely to distrust counsel appointed by the court. In some instances cited 
by the American judge interviewed, this inherent distrust is exacerbated by the desire 
of the counsel to plead diminished responsibility, which cuts into the accused’s sense of 
his own dignity. And in one notorious terrorist trial the judge said the prosecution and 
accused were more often aligned against the defense counsel than the defense counsel 
and the accused against the prosecution.
iii.  Post-Milosevic Application of the Right to Self-Represent
After announcing the right to self-representation in Milosevic and expanding it in Krajis-
nik, the appeals chamber proceeded to apply it in ways that have added not only to the 
practical problems of running a leader trial but to some confusion about the doctrine 
itself. The Seselj case is particularly troubling in this regard. In October 2006, the appel-
late chamber reviewed a decision by the trial chamber assigning counsel to Seselj who 
was representing himself. Seselj had from the onset of his pretrial appearances, the trial 
chamber noted, “increasingly demonstrated a tendency to act in an obstructionist fash-
ion while at the same time revealing a need for legal assistance.” The trial chamber had 
previously appointed a standby counsel but now imposed an assigned counsel “effective 
immediately” on the basis that Seselj’s intimidation of and slanderous comments about 
the witnesses, his “disruptive behavior and deliberate disrespect for the rules indicates 
that his self-representation may substantially and persistently obstruct the proper and 
expeditious conduct of a fair trial.”
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 There was no doubt that his behavior up to the 
time of the trial chamber’s decision to impose counsel fell within the appeals chamber’s 
formula for withdrawing the right to self-representation. It included repeated declara-
tions in open court that he would “destroy the tribunal,” as well as numerous prohibited 
statements to the press about the forthcoming elections in which the radical Serb party 
he still led was an active candidate. He had—even more crucially—revealed the name of 
a protected witness and disclosed confidential material to nonauthorized persons. The 
appeals chamber agreed that such conduct merited imposition of counsel even if not 
intentionally done to obstruct the trial, explaining the conduct need not be so extreme 
as to make continuation of the trial “impossible” before counsel can be imposed. The 
appellate division then, however, ruled that before counsel can be imposed the accused 
had to be given a specific warning that assigned counsel was under consideration and 
that warning had not been given here. (Seselj, though self-represented, had a standby 
counsel appointed and a backroom legal team of 28 members, and he had been warned 
repeatedly about the prospect of sanctions, though not in this instance specifically 
about imposition of counsel.) After the trial chamber imposed counsel, Seselj refused 
to communicate with assigned counsel or even appear in court. The appeals chamber 
remanded to the trial chamber with the instruction that a specific warning of imposition 
of counsel must be given on the basis of new obstructionist behavior before his right to 
self-represent could be taken away.
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On remand, the trial chamber returned Seselj’s status to his prior one before 
assigned counsel, that is, self-representation but with the standby counsel appointed six 
months before. Seselj, on hearing of this ruling, refused to come to the courtroom and 
entered into a hunger strike. The standby counsel took over the pretrial proceedings, 
and Seselj was warned that if he persisted in his conduct, counsel would be imposed, 
which is what happened. On appeal of the second order imposing counsel, Seselj argued 
that the appeals chamber’s original decision vacating the order of assigned counsel did 
not allow the trial court to revert to the prior standby counsel arrangement before any 
new disruptive behavior had occurred. To the disappointment of many, the appeals 
chamber did not back the trial chamber even against this record of continued obstruc-
tions and defiance of a specific warning that counsel would be imposed. The appeals 
chamber said its prior decision was not “clear” on the issue of standby counsel and the 
trial court had erred in interpreting it to allow reversion to the original regime before 
any new misconduct had occurred. The appeals chamber also noted that the standby 
counsel was the same person previously appointed as assigned counsel and a person 
Seselj would not acknowledge or work with in any capacity. It said Seselj could go back 
to representing himself until he misbehaved again, after being given a new specific 
warning and a hearing after the misbehavior. And if standby or any kind of counsel was 
subsequently appointed for cause, Seselj would be allowed to pick the one he wanted. 
In addition, the appeals chamber granted a recess of proceedings to allow Seselj to 
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recuperate fully from his hunger strike so he could adequately represent himself.
122
 The 
decision was widely criticized, with many arguing that it “should not be seen as good 
appellate law.”
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 The conditions of the standby counsel had actually been very concilia-
tory to Seselj: the counsel could only offer advice and suggestions to Seselj, address the 
court only on Seselj’s or the court’s request, be present in the courtroom, and examine 
witnesses only on request of court if the defendant was disruptive.
With a new judge in charge and representing himself fully, Seselj promptly moved 
to obtain payment for his self-selected legal advisory team. He would not, however, 
fulfill the requirements of the indigency assessment. Yet he demanded $6.3 million 
for past expenses of his legal advisors, arguing that his legal assistants should be paid 
as regularly assigned lead counsel. The registry objected, arguing that fees for experts 
or investigators to aid a self-represented defendant might be legitimate, but fees for 
handpicked legal assistants were not. The new pretrial judge sided with Seselj, writ-
ing an expansive opinion to the effect that the right to self-represent oneself cannot be 
controlled by financial restrictions; in detention the self-represented defendant needs 
legal assistance to search for witnesses and evidence. Although defendants should not 
normally be paid for drafting submissions (that is what self-representation is all about), 
the judge remarked that the latest submissions by Seselj were “more concise, better 
organized and reasoned” and showed the hand of legally trained assistants who could 
be paid for that work. Seselj was entitled to pay for “associates.” To obtain funding for 
his defense, Seselj had to designate one or more associates who met the qualification 
requirements for counsel assigned by the registry. To date, Seselj has not complied to 
the registrar’s satisfaction with the indigence assessment and the request for funding 
is before the court with Seselj threatening not to present a defense at all if he does not 
get his requested funding.
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In the meantime, the prosecutor filed a new motion to impose assigned counsel 
on Seselj as a result of new asserted breaches of confidentiality with reference to a pro-
tected witness and the use of his team members to intimidate and “harm” prospective 
prosecution witnesses. In a separate proceeding, Seselj was found in contempt of court 
for the earlier handling of confidential information. But the trial continued with Seselj 
representing himself while the motion to reimpose counsel was being decided. 
Recently, however, the trial has been suspended because of the danger to the integ-
rity of the proceeding due to threats to prosecution witnesses. Like Milosevic, Seselj had 
obtained a relaxed trial schedule of four hours a day, three days a week; it was calculated 
his defense will take more than a year with 50 percent of the time to be allotted to his 
own testimony. The Seselj appeals chamber rulings, according to one commentator, 
“call[] into question the very idea of international criminal justice as an orderly, ratio-
nal, functional, legal system.”
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 The ICTY rulings restoring his self-representation were 
“procedurally arbitrary, intellectually unconvincing, and vulnerable to improper political 
considerations.”
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 Tribunal officials predict future trial courts will likely think long and 
hard before imposing counsel against a defendant’s will.
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The Krajisnik case supplies a third example of an appellate ruling that recognizes 
self-representation even beyond the boundaries of the national precedents the judges 
originally relied on to establish the right. The appeals chamber confirmed the registry’s 
decision holding that an indigent accused who elects to represent himself is not entitled 
to have legal assistance paid for by the tribunal pursuant to Article 24(4)(d), which pro-
vides a right to have legal assistance assigned if the defendant cannot pay. The appeals 
chamber further confirmed that the term “facilities” in Article 21(4)(b) of the statute 
guaranteeing a defendant adequate time and facilities to mount his defense does not 
encompass legal assistance. The appeals chamber, however, accepted that limited fund-
ing has to be provided for legal associates outside the tribunal’s legal aid scheme “to 
the extent that the registry requires or encourages indigent self-presenting accused to 
coordinate their defences through designated legal associates.”
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Not unexpectedly, after being granted the right, Krajisnik then sought financ-
ing for his self-representation as well as a right to receive all filings in his own Balkan 
language, demands agreed to by the ICTY registry (translation of the judgment by the 
registry into Serbian alone took 10 months). He sought but was refused funding for 
legal assistance at the same rates as if he had assigned counsel. Krajisnik, however, 
does get funding for three advisers paid at a lower rate who also have privileged access 
to confidential material. Krajisnik has recently asked for and been granted the right to 
retain special counsel to argue specific issues on appeal. He subsequently retained pri-
vate counsel at his own expense to argue a single issue—joint criminal enterprise—in 
the appeal.
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There can be little doubt that the appeals chamber decisions have encouraged 
self-representation by future senior military and civilian leaders on trial. The decisions 
have been perceived by many as giving way to defendants’ “blackmail” consisting of 
threats of hunger strikes and boycotts, and in doing so diminishing respect for the trial 
courts, which the appellate chamber itself says deserve substantial deference in dealing 
with the day-to-day problems of these complex and lengthy trials and are in the best 
position to appraise the defendants’ motives and good faith as well as the effect of their 
disruption on the trial and witnesses. The appeal chamber has also been criticized in 
letting adherence to an extreme and absolutist interpretation of the right to self-repre-
sentation not recognized in customary international law, trump the more holistic goal 
of fair and expeditious trials.
130
 No other tribunal, national or international, appears 
to have gone so far in upholding the right of self-representation under circumstances 
that make it a formidable obstacle to an orderly trial.
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 According to Boas, “a disturbing 
picture begins to emerge of an appellate jurisdiction overly zealous in its interference 
with the trial court’s conduct of the proceedings, yet poorly equipped to do so.”
132
 There 
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is a wide consensus that the appeals chamber should only interfere with the trial court’s 
decision about imposing counsel when there has been a clear error. Boas argues that 
poor appellate decisions like the current ones help to create a perception that there is 
no line between legal and political process. He proposed one appellate court panel for 
all international tribunals comprised of “high quality, independent” judges, but that is 
not likely to happen.
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Self-represented defendants, in the meantime, should be fastidiously warned of 
the specific consequences of disruptive behavior before and during the trial, but when 
those consequences ensue, the trial court should be afforded deference in imposing 
counsel unless it is clearly wrong. Standby counsel are automatically appointed in Amer-
ican terrorist trials featuring self-represented defendants. Indeed, the original condi-
tions attached to the appointment of standby counsel in the Seselj case seem eminently 
reasonable. The enormous costs—time, personnel, money, prestige of the court—in 
permitting endless months of vituperative outbursts and even witness intimidation to 
go on before definitive action can be taken, militate toward a reconsideration of the 
ICTY’s jurisprudence in this thematic area by future international courts.
V. Media Control
There is widespread agreement that the disruptive leader seeks above all exposure in 
the media for his courtroom performances. And thus far the media seem inclined to 
cooperate. The media’s focus in these trials has been predominantly on the accused 
and his antics rather than on the evidence of his crimes or on victims’ testimony. The 
televised transmittal of leadership trials has undoubtedly encouraged the defendants’ 
performances; if the TV were shut down, almost certainly they would subside. Back in 
the time of the Chicago 7 trial, Dorsen and Friedman commented, “[o]ne intuitively 
suspects that if trials got no publicity, courtroom disruption would be engaged in only 
by the incompetent and the insane.”
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Nobody suggests the press be barred from the trials, but many do suggest they 
could exercise some restraint. For instance, in 1944, the Washington Post stopped cov-
ering the Nazi Party trials during the vitriolic rants of some of the defendants, on the 
ground that the rants were not “newsworthy.”
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 In contrast, during the Hussein trial, the 
34 cameras in the courtroom focused almost exclusively on the defendants’ “harangues 
and threats” rather than the judges’ responses to them. Such news coverage can assur-
edly be misleading to the public. In the few instances where Saddam Hussein refused 
to obey the judges’ admonitions to sit down, the cameras followed the ensuing argu-
ments closely; they did not of course make note of the many more times when he 
obeyed the judge. When Hussein boycotted the trial, the press did not even cover the 
courtroom events that went on in his absence.
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 Charles Krauthammer wrote that, like 
Eichmann, Hussein should be kept in a glass box where his ranting could be shut off by 
the judges: “The lead story of every court session has been his demeanor, his defiance, 
   4 7
4 8    M E D I A  C O N T R O L
his imperiousness. . . . [T]he evidence brought against him by his hapless victims—tes-
timony mangled in translation and electronic voice alteration—made the back pages at 
best.”
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American advisers had strongly but unsuccessfully urged the Iraqi tribunal to 
appoint an official spokesperson for the court who could explain the meaning of trial 
events and rulings to the press, particularly the out-of-country press who would not 
understand the language in which the trial was being conducted. The court’s response 
fell wide of the mark—they named one of the judges who obviously was impeded from 
going far outside the record. The court did finally set up a website, but it was too primi-
tive and limited to official material to perform much of an educational function.
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 As 
a result, the press coverage tended to treat the trial like a “sports competition”
139
—who 
scored the points on whom that day—rather than the historic landmark it represented 
nationally and internationally for a national figure who had dominated the Middle East-
ern political scene for decades and was now being tried for murdering thousands of his 
country’s citizens. Milosevic similarly planned his own media strategy, releasing docu-
ments to the press from his detention unit and patently courting their attention in the 
courtroom. And the press seemed all too willing to play along.
These trials further demonstrate that an outreach strategy needs to be planned 
by the court with the press in mind before the trial begins. The court cannot count on 
the televised trial to make the national and international audience understand what is 
going on in year-long complex trials. Legal experts need to be conscripted to be available 
to the press to discuss the fine legal points and significance of testimony and of proce-
dural rulings. (I remember from my own experience that when even a relatively short 
100-page judgment was handed down, the reporters would run to NGO representatives 
in the courthouse asking, “What does this mean?” “Where does it say that . . . ?”) For 
these trials, the court needs to have auxiliary help in insuring that the basic message 
in the trials gets through and that at least some thoughtful segment of the press will 
treat them as the historic events they are, not as “gotcha” games where antics, shouting, 
shocking displays, and animated animosity are the only stories worth covering. Such 
efforts, of course, must begin long before trial, certainly by the time the indictment or 
charges come down. Obviously, discretion is needed so as not to prejudice the defen-
dant by talking about the actual evidence beforehand, but the theories of the defense 
and prosecution, summaries of witness testimony, even the significance of the court’s 
interim rulings can be discussed. There ought to be someone or some place reporters 
can go to obtain answers to legitimate questions during the trial so that their stories will 
be accurate and focused on the important aspects of the trial. More balanced coverage 
could substantially affect the behavior of publicity-seeking defendants.
In the Moussaoui terrorist trial, the presiding judge together with the Adminis-
trative Office of the Courts set up an elaborate outreach program to inform press and 
public about the ongoing trial.
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 It was decided that a nonjudicial press officer was 
essential and an experienced former editor of the American Bar Association’s main 
publication was hired for that job to answer inquiries of the press. He also assisted the 
administrative office in the establishment in several locations across the United States 
of simulated courtrooms presided over by retired judicial officers or experienced court-
room participants to which victims’ families and survivors of 9/11 could come, watch 
the trial, and ask questions. A special website was set up on which all the nonclassified 
pleadings and record material as well as updated information on the trial was posted.
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VI. Systemic Problems in 
 Self-Representation
The immense practical problems of running a trial with a self-represented defendant 
transcend how to deal with his misbehavior, and while they may not alone justify with-
holding the right, they deserve some consideration in weighing the balance between 
this one right of the defendant and the rights of the other trial participants to a fair and 
orderly trial. In counseled trials, defense counsel is generally the foreman of a team; 
he assures that proper papers are filed, deadlines and regulations met, negotiations at 
pretrial conferences conducted, evidence culled, investigators hired and supervised, and 
witnesses interviewed and prepared for trial. A defendant in detention is at a severe 
disadvantage in locating and interviewing witnesses and other evidence in the field and 
in collecting documents, answering prosecution and judicial inquiries, and conforming 
to disclosure rules; in reading and evaluating hundreds of thousands of pages of docu-
ments and transcripts, he can be easily overwhelmed. Del Ponte makes a strong case 
that leaders who are allowed to self-represent import huge time delays into the trial: 
  Milosevic’s ‘defense’ consumed inordinate amounts of courtroom time, not only because it 
enabled him to present a stream of irrelevant political and historical questions and arguments, 
but also because the prosecution found itself with no interlocutor, no objective counsel with 
whom to stipulate undisputed facts or sort out technical questions. This left it to the trial judges 
to handle mundane issues, including the minutiae of Milosevic’s treatment in the detention 
unit, in open court rather than outside. The Trial Chamber’s decision to appoint three ‘friends 
of the court’ or amici curiae, attorneys to provide a defense of sorts did not help matters. This 
was a bastardization of the customary practice that allows amici curiae to advise a court.
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Courts recognize the tension and have labored to render help and accommoda-
tions so that the basic right of a defendant to adequate time and facilities to prepare his 
defense is honored. 
In Milosevic’s case, the trial court made “extraordinary pretrial arrangements” 
by way of detailed instructions to the defendant on necessary filings and discovery 
disclosures.
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 The registry kept detailed time logs made available to the defendant so 
that he could keep track of his allotted trial time; the court itself engaged in frequent 
warnings that time was running out, pointing out when questions were irrelevant or 
cumulative, urging him to submit written instead of oral testimony. As aforementioned, 
amici were appointed to insure identification of all relevant issues should the defendant 
miss some; they were allowed to make submissions in pretrial motions, examine wit-
nesses as appropriate, inform the court of any mitigating exculpatory evidence, and 
engage in any other activity deemed necessary for a fair trial. In fact, the amici did sub-
mit memoranda on the tricky issues of command responsibility under Article 7(1) of 
the ICTY Charter and on joint criminal enterprise. Additionally, Milosevic was allowed 
to have privileged communications with his self-appointed “legal associates”; in toto he 
had a legal team of 20 or more lawyers and investigators.
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Hans Holthius, the former ICTY registrar, in a recent speech, spoke of the prob-
lems of accommodating self-represented or pro se defendants—as of June 2009, two in 
pretrial, one in trial, and one on appeal. A recently established pro se office with coor-
dinated services and resources provided to the pro se defendants will “streamline” and 
communicate requests submitted by the accused to the appropriate sections of the tri-
bunal; provide guidance on procedural requirements for filing, limiting itself, however, 
to a “facilitating role, providing no legal or strategic advice to the accused”; and ensure 
that translation facilities are made available for the “key documents . . . necessary for 
the accused to understand the nature and cause of the charges against him.”
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All of this, of course, puts a heavy burden on court resources and subtracts those 
resources from availability to other trials. Moreover, according to registry officials, trans-
lation requests peculiar to self-represented defendants are the most formidable for the 
court. Regular counsel are required to be facile in one of the two official languages of the 
court, English and French, in which all court documents are filed and judgments issued. 
Self-represented accused who are not themselves fluent in English or French, however, 
are entitled to receive those documents translated into their native language, usually one 
of several Balkan dialects, an effort requiring enormous expenditure of resources and 
time. It took 10 months to translate the trial court judgment in one case, and most self-
representation cases engender significant translation delays in case-processing time. 
A welcome exception is the recent decision by the Karadzic trial chamber that the defen-
dant understands English well enough not to require documents to which he is entitled 
under discovery Rule 66(A) to be translated into his native language.
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 Self-represented 
accused who do not understand the official languages must also be assigned a language 
assistant to help translate other case materials. The accused are provided storage facili-
ties and basic computer technology in detention to prepare their case. This has meant 
extra duties for security personnel in the detention unit as the accused receives frequent 
visits from his “team” and papers flowing in and out of the unit have to be monitored. 
Privileged visiting rooms, phones, faxes, and storage space must be provided and special 
hours of access thereto by his team have to be arranged.
One of the high-level officials at the registry describes self-representation as a 
“nightmare” for the system. He explains that when the “right” was recognized in the 
Milosevic and Sesilj cases, there was no reasonable fit between the special circumstances 
of self-representation and the way the various tribunal systems operate for counseled 
defendants. While a number of adjustments have since been made to some parts of the 
system to address the particular funding demands of pro se defendants and facilities 
made available to prepare and present their cases, the system is still deficient in many 
ways. The scope of the translation requirement is a case in point: Does the right to 
receive evidence in one’s own tongue include transcripts from other trials (which were 
originally required to be only in English or French) when they are reintroduced into 
his trial? Or is an audio recording of the witness testimony together with a transcript 
in English or French sufficient to meet that requirement? The answer has varied from 
chamber to chamber. In too many cases, the delays engendered by momentous transla-
tion demands are still “enormous.”
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Confidentiality breaches are another potentially higher risk in pro se trials. The 
defendant rather than his counsel is provided with the identity and statements of pros-
ecution witnesses, often under protective conditions. But there have been significant 
leaks of confidential materials in the pro se cases; witnesses in other pro se trials have 
also shown reluctance to appear and be examined by the defendant, and, in interna-
tional trials, there is no effective compulsory process to make them come. The registry 
requires “undertakings” from approved legal “associates” of a self-represented defendant 
to protect confidentiality but admits there is really no way to enforce them. In situations 
like the Seselj case, the accused may still be active politically in their regions, and the 
danger of their using protected evidence to further political aims is a real one.
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The tactics of these self-represented accused seems clear: to amass a legal backup 
team which will support their out-front efforts in the courtroom to the maximum 
degree possible. That team will be selected and controlled by the leader himself, not 
appointed by the court as an amicus or standby counsel might. The critical question then 
becomes—how much will the court pay to different members of his team? 
The registry’s formal remuneration scheme allows funding for some legal assis-
tance but not under the normal Legal Aid Fund reserved for assigned counsel. Quali-
fications for funding the legal associates are similar to those for assistants to assigned 
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counsel. Up to four persons may normally be paid—a legal associate, a case manager, 
an investigator, and a language assistant. There must be a case manager among them 
to maintain a defense filing system, recording and classifying disclosure material, sub-
mitting documents for translation, scanning and uploading documents to the e-court 
system. The pro se accused may also receive payments for a defense expert(s) up to a 
maximum number of hours. To be paid, legal associates must meet certain professional 
requirements and not have been guilty of a criminal act, involved in a relevant disci-
plinary proceeding, have engaged in unethical conduct, or provided false or incomplete 
information to the registry. They must have written and oral proficiency in one of the 
two official languages of the court, and undertake to comply with the Code of Profes-
sional Conduct for counsel appearing before the tribunal. The registry will provide 
office space for the team, which is not allowed inside the courtroom except with court 
permission.
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In the end, however, even with the good faith attempts to provide aides and facili-
ties to the self-represented defendant, there remains the question raised by ICTY and 
American judges: whether in monumentally big, long, and complex trials, there can 
even be a fair shake to either the defendant or the rest of the participants and the com-
munity at large when no trained counsel is representing the defendant in the court-
room. (Charles Taylor, the deposed Liberian president, on trial before the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, boycotted his first scheduled appearance on the ground that the trial 
was a “charade” because of the purported sparse resources granted him in his self-
representation.
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) The defendant and the rest of the participants may well be pursuing 
different aims in the trial, but the raison d’être of a criminal trial, national or interna-
tional, is to provide an orderly and rule-based forum in which evidence can be evaluated 
on the ultimate quest for justice. There is reason to credit veteran judges’ views that 
some cases, such as leader ones discussed here, are just too “big” to make the process 
credible if the defense spokesperson in the courtroom is not familiar with the rules, or 
able outside the courtroom to lead the investigation. The adjustments required on the 
rest of the system—massive translation capacity, expensive backroom legal assistants, 
hybrid devices like standby counsel, or assigned counsel confined to more restricted 
duties than his professional obligations dictate—result in delays and inefficiencies not 
just in routines and practices but in the overall goal of allowing the judges to make the 
best judgment on the best evidence available. It may well be that a different, stricter 
approach is needed both as to when self-representation will be denied initially in the 
interests of a fair and efficient trial for everyone—witness, victim, defendant—and later 
on when the progress of the trial shows that either the defendant’s own behavior or 
health or the sheer complexity of the trial itself make it unduly difficult to move the 
trial along in any orderly way.
VII. Lessons for Upcoming 
 Leader Trials
Radovan Karadzic, one of the top 3 among 161 indictees of the ICTY, a “principal sus-
pect[] of the most serious crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991,”
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 was 
finally apprehended in 2008 after 13 years on the run and is scheduled to go to trial in 
2009. ICTY supporters have every interest in conducting “a perfect trial” to offset the 
disappointing experience with the Milosevic trial. It is a propitious time to take stock of 
past mistakes and make plans to avoid them.
There are good signs and bad. For one thing, Karadzic’s health is apparently good, 
so at least theoretically the trial can proceed without frequent adjournments for health 
crises and, it is hoped, on a full schedule rather than a few hours a few days a week. 
Thus the danger of a lengthy trial stretching into years may be avoided. On the other 
hand, lawyers who practice at the ICTY point out that the Karadzic trial, like the Milo-
sevic trial, involves a combination of Srebrenica, Sarajevo, and dozens of municipalities 
and that the primary challenge for the prosecution will be how to get the size and the 
complexity of the evidence into the record in whatever time is allotted to them. In its exit 
strategy, the court is anticipated to be more parsimonious than in earlier trials.
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As of June 2009, it appears Karadzic will be tried alone without codefendants, 
although Radko Mladic, the chief of the Bosnian Serb Army and the most notorious 
indictee still at large, may be a codefendant if arrested prior to or early in the trial, since 
he is the alleged coperpetrator with Karadzic of the four criminal enterprises with which 
Karadzic is charged in his current indictment. A decade ago the two were indicted as 
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codefendants and Rule 61 hearings were held at the ICTY to publish all the prosecutor’s 
evidence against them in order to obtain international arrest warrants. Mladic would 
naturally have to be caught in time, but if he were, there might be pressure for a joint 
trial given the exit phase that the ICTY is now on and in order to save resources through 
one trial instead of two. As we have seen, however, multiple defendants can heighten 
the risk of disorderly trials, and though Karadzic’s temperament is only beginning to be 
revealed, plentiful evidence in prior ICTY proceedings suggests Mladic is an explosive 
character, given to tirades and outbursts.
152
 (There are, however, rumors he currently 
suffers from disabling ailments.) 
In his first appearances in court, Karadzic has attacked the tribunal as a “bas-
tardized judicial system . . . created to blame the Serbs,” before which he refused to 
plead.
153
 He has also declared an intent to represent himself and has raised issues of 
alleged immunity from prosecution based on supposed agreements with Richard Hol-
brooke sanctioned by the UN Security Council that were his quid pro quo for agreeing 
to stay out of future Bosnian politics.
154
 There are other signals of a potentially volatile 
and politicized trial. In a status conference, Karadzic said he will contest everything 
except “the weather” and refused to agree to stipulations of “uncontested facts.” So far 
he has “unleashed an avalanche of nearly 100 pretrial motions and briefs,” indicating 
that unlike Milosevic he intends to engage in the legal arguments intensively.
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 With 
Karadzic announcing he will represent himself, the presiding pretrial judge has taken 
care to warn him of the problems with self-representation. But Karadzic has not been 
dissuaded. Karadzic also requested expensive funding for his “defence team”; the regis-
try allowed only the limited amount of funding for legal assistance and support staff in 
line with its remuneration scheme for self-represented defendants. Karadzic, however, 
complained the rates were too low for the “high level” legal assistance he requires; the 
trial court has refused to alter that decision. The appeals chamber cleared the air by 
emphatically agreeing with the trial court that where an accused lacks the requisite legal 
know-how to allow for a fair and expeditious trial, the solution is not to fund expensive 
assistants above their normal pay rate but rather to curtail the defendant’s right to self-
representation.
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There have already been changes made in the original pretrial roster of judges, 
including the withdrawal of one judge who had presided over a prior trial involving 
findings of fact implicating Karadzic in a criminal enterprise that overlapped with the 
current charges.
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 One note of encouragement is the recent third amended indictment, 
which streamlines and shortens it from earlier versions.
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 According to the prosecutors’ 
explanation in their motion to amend, the proposed changes would add many more par-
ticularized facts to the allegations about the defendant’s individual responsibility under 
the modes of liability, command responsibility, and criminal enterprise, give him more 
precise notice of the charges, and reduce the crime sites involving municipalities from 
41 to 27. It would take account of developing jurisprudence at the ICTY as to the details 
which must be given about a defendant’s alleged involvement in a criminal enterprise, 
and charges four separate criminal enterprises with different objectives rather than one 
overall enterprise (as in the Milosevic indictment), and with different coperpetrators 
(except for Mladic) and different “foreseeable consequences.” More details are given 
as to the manner in which he is alleged to have exercised command responsibility and 
how he knew of subordinates’ actions. Charges of grave breaches of the Geneva Con-
ventions requiring as they do proof of the international complexion of the conflict have 
been dropped. An extensive addendum is attached identifying killings charged and their 
locations, as well as detention camps involved in incidents referred to.
It seems as though the Karadzic prosecutors have taken note of Boas’s complaints 
about the Milosevic indictment. The revised version is considerably shorter and “more 
manageable” than its Milosevic predecessor.
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 On the other hand, it adds two new counts 
and new factual assertions under four others. The prosecutors plead, however, that in 
the case of 13 new killings alleged, all have been found to have occurred in prior judg-
ments and so can be proved by adjudicated facts. A reading of the new indictment does 
support the prosecutors’ claim that there are more facts and details given, but it also 
convinces that this will almost certainly be a “big” case involving as it does the genocide 
at Srebrenica, the siege of Sarajevo, the atrocities committed in taking over 21 munici-
palities, and the hostage-taking of UN military observers and peacekeepers. 
There are some tough legal issues emanating from the indictment as well. The 
indictment charges, inter alia, genocide as a foreseeable consequence of a criminal 
enterprise despite that crime’s definitional requirement of a specific intent to destroy, 
and apparently relies on the destruction of group leaders and “substantial numbers” of 
the group to show genocide in the case of the municipalities taken over by the Serbs, 
even though a similar theory did not succeed in the International Court of Justice case 
alleging genocide throughout the Bosnian region. Lawyers at the ICTY involved point 
out that as the number of these major leader trials grows, the defense counsel become 
more sophisticated in their pleadings and arguments, taking heed of the court’s still 
developing jurisprudence. They learn from the mistakes of their predecessors.
And what one commentator calls the “dark cloud” of the “unworthy legal 
precedent”
160
 of the Seselj case hangs over new self-representation cases. Though some 
hope that decisions in Seselj were an aberration attributable to the timing so soon after 
Milosevic’s death in detention, questions remain: If the trial should break down, will the 
trial court feel free to impose counsel—even standby counsel—to assure it moves ahead? 
Will there be boycotts and hunger strikes by the defendant to pressure restoration of the 
right, if the trial court does insist on proceeding with counsel? Will the Karadzic trial 
court, heeding the criticism that the Milosevic court was too lenient with the defendant’s 
antics and not willing to enforce its rules and orders, take a firmer stand? According to 
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one former ICTY prosecutor, “It comes down to the question of how to overturn the 8 
December Decision [Seselj] and make it obsolete”; “The Karadzic case is an excellent 
opportunity for the Prosecutor to restore the reasonable interpretation to the right to 
self-representation and prevent serious abuse to the right.”
161
 Not just this seminal case 
at the ICTY but the entire legacy of the court may be at stake.
With regard to future leader trials in international courts, the underlying problem 
of inexperienced and unknowledgeable judges is repeatedly raised. How can a judge 
who has no background in the history of an international or an intranational conflict 
decide authoritatively whether something is relevant? The relative ignorance of judges 
from afar as to the centuries-old history of the particular conflict they are hearing about 
is apt to diminish their ability to rule confidently on the boundaries of what the leader 
wants to declaim about. It is like having foreign judges rule on American civil rights 
cases which involve U.S. racial policies going back to the Civil War. Much of the in-trial 
haggling, it is suggested, might be avoided if the judges are exposed before trial to the 
background and history of the conflict and the players (some read up on the history 
of the region on their own, but many do not). But this, of course, runs counter to the 
notion of the “impartial” judge who comes to the trial with an open and uninformed 
mind. When the ad hoc courts were established, the Anglo-Saxon adversarial mode of 
trial was virtually taken for granted but in this respect as in many others it may not be 
particularly suitable for massive trials of the sort discussed here. There should be new 
rules and perhaps even a new mode of proof that build on the experience of the past 
few decades both as to the orientation of judges to the historical background of these 
cases and as to the method of authenticating that background as well as crime sites. As 
it is, prosecutors say they do not know from case to case and from chamber to chamber 
whether they can count on adjudicated facts from prior cases to prove part of their cur-
rent case.
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VIII. Conclusion and 
 Recommendations 
 for Future Trials
Experience so far has shown that trials involving leaders determined to make their 
case to a worldwide audience will inevitably be hard to control. The personality and 
experience of the judge in the final analysis may have more to do with producing a 
reasonably fair and efficient trial than any set of prescribed best practices. A cool but 
firm temperament that refuses to be riled by the antics of volatile defendants (or their 
counsel) is most likely to carry the day. These trials in the end often turn into a contest 
of wills between the judges and the defendant, and wily defendants used to political and 
even military conflicts can detect the scent of an uneasy judge, lacking in confidence in 
controlling the courtroom. Nonetheless, experience also provides a number of critical 
points in a prosecution and trial where outbursts may be anticipated or even provoked 
and which may be avoided or at least better controlled by planning ahead or by rapid 
and steady judicial responses. Leaders’ increasing demands to represent themselves are 
a primary area of contention in this regard. There is as yet no guarantee that any or all 
of the control techniques designed will work in a particular trial, given the idiosyncra-
sies of these leaders and their abilities to adapt to changing challenges. These leader 
trials, however, are inevitably destined to be the crown jewels or the fatal flaws in the 
international criminal court system, and it is necessary to the intelligent evolution of 
that system that we glean from mistakes and successes of the past how to run them 
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better. This recount of past experiences and the following summary of recommenda-
tions emanating from that experience are attempts to begin that process. 
The Scope of the Charges
• Limiting Charges: Prosecutors and judges should seriously consider whether, 
other things being equal, it is preferable to limit charges against high-profile 
defendants in complex cases to a reasonably small number that can be proven 
by direct evidence and that will not result in an excessively long trial or invite 
repeated debates over the relevance of evidence to those charges. 
• Framing Charges: Indictments should use historical and ideological references 
with care and parsimony to avoid politicizing the trial and justifying defendants 
forays into history and national politics to make their case. Theories of command 
responsibility and criminal enterprise liability should attempt to focus on specific 
examples of crimes that can be linked to the leaders with as few intermediary lay-
ers of officialdom as possible. The indictments should be detailed as to the theory 
of liability and the facts of examples chosen. 
• Trial Judges: Trial judges should be given deference when they decide that a trial 
is unmanageable because of the scope of the charges and that severance of some 
charges is necessary to complete it in a reasonable time. 
• Joinder of Defendants: When other considerations do not outweigh, the number 
of defendants in a leader trial should be kept as low as possible to avoid higher 
risks of disorderly behavior stemming from defendants’ and multiple counsels’ 
support and encouragement of each other.
Judicial Control of the Proceedings
• Judges’ Conduct: A judge’s experience and personality are key to managing 
high-profile trials. Assignment to preside over leader cases should be based on 
experience and temperament; workshops on courtroom management, including 
managing self-represented defendants, should be available. Judges who have suc-
cessfully conducted leader trials should make their expertise available to new 
judges appointed to these trials. Managing prosecutors and defense counsel will 
require fairness and a lack of antagonism; the appearance of independence and 
freedom from political influences is paramount. Critical motions on jurisdiction, 
severance, and admissibility should be dealt with before trial to cut down on the 
number of contentious issues that defendants can plausibly raise during trial.
• Setting a Framework: Setting a framework for a fair and efficient trial is the first 
line of defense to avoid disruptive behavior. This includes refining trial prepara-
tion and setting clear guidelines for time limits for both sides as well as setting 
limits on crimes and crime sites that will be offered into evidence. This can be 
done without impeding prosecutorial discretion. For example, a judge might tell 
a prosecutor to reduce counts but should generally not specify which particular 
counts to be dropped. Crime base issues can often be dealt with through sum-
maries of undisputed evidence, or a single judge may be designated to hear and 
prepare findings on this evidence, or a few representative examples involving a 
limited number of witnesses may be selected. Establishing a clear and consistent 
method for establishing and utilizing adjudicated facts can assist in the reduction 
of trial time.
• Continuity and Ground Rules: Where there is no statutory obstacle, continu-
ity of judges throughout the pretrial and trial process is desirable for ensuring 
consistency in agreements reached between all parties as well as avoiding new 
restrictions and unclear expectations. Ground rules should be clear and include 
expectations of the responsibilities of counsel, submissions deadlines, and sanc-
tions for violations. 
• Judicial Sanctions: A series of options—temporary removal of defendants, con-
tempt, reduced privileges, physical restraint as a last resort—can be imposed on 
recalcitrant defendants, but each has its own advantages and disadvantages, par-
ticularly when used often. Court and professional rules of conduct as well as 
disciplinary mechanisms and contempt should be used to sanction misbehavior 
of counsel, including removal from the list of approved counsel. Sanctions should 
be context-specific and not automatic; judicial responses should escalate if bad 
behavior continues. 
Self-Representation
• Warnings: Defendants should be warned in advance, both before and during trial, 
of the specific consequences of disruptive behavior. The court should then follow 
through with imposing the warned-of sanction if disruption occurs. Appellate 
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chambers should give a high level of discretion to trial judges in their decisions 
on sanctions. 
• Microphone: Judges should be able to cut off the microphone of defendants (or 
counsel) when necessary, particularly when a defendant strays outside the issues, 
bullies a witness, or violates a protection order.
• Clarifying Standards for Imposition and Rescission of Self-Representation: The 
standards for granting and denying self-representation should be reevaluated so 
as to reflect the creditable arguments that some cases are simply too complex and 
potentially too unmanageable to allow the defendant’s choice to represent himself 
to be absolute. The interests of witnesses and of the court and the public in a fair 
and manageable trial are worthy of consideration. A trial court’s decisions as to 
when the right should be denied deserve reasonable deference from the appellate 
court. Sufficient time and reasonable resources, including paid assistants, should 
be furnished a defendant who is granted the right, but he should not be awarded 
the same level of paid legal assistance as if he had regular assigned counsel. Trial 
judges should be accorded deference by appellate courts in deciding if standby 
counsel should be appointed to help the defendant on request or auxiliary coun-
sel appointed to represent the interests of the court in obtaining a full view of 
the issues in the trial. When a defendant abuses the privilege by substantial and 
persistent misconduct or where it becomes evident he cannot represent himself 
adequately enough to ensure a fair trial, the trial court should impose counsel, and 
its decision should be accorded significant deference by the appellate chamber.
Media Control
• Media: The court should adopt in advance of trial a media strategy designed to 
acquaint the press with the critical issues of the trial and their legal significance. 
On a day-to-day basis there should be a court spokesperson to explain the import 
of the proceedings or particular testimony and to deflect media preoccupation 
with the antic behavior or outbursts of the defendant. 
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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS, as well as national courts, are holding 
an increasing number of heads of state and other leaders accountable 
for gross abuses of human rights committed while they held power. 
Some of the former leaders put on trial have attempted to use their 
right to self-representation to disrupt and discredit the proceedings. 
In Tyrants on Trial: Keeping Order in the Courtroom, Patricia M. Wald, 
who served as a judge on the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, writes about the difﬁculties of ensuring a fair trial 
when former leaders defend themselves by attacking the court. Drawing 
on her experiences, and the experiences of judges and participants in 
other celebrated proceedings, Wald provides insightful lessons learned 
and practical recommendations for upcoming leader trials. Her report 
is invaluable to everyone connected with the international courts—and 
anyone interested in the cause of international justice.
